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“As an ultimate objective, the ombudsman can bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark 
places, even over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds”. 
























The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) was assented to by the 
erstwhile President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, on the 10th of December 1996 and came 
into effect on the 4th of February 1997.1 Arguably, one of the most remarkable features of this 
Constitution is that it is not merely a formal document that seeks to regulate public power. 
Instead, much like the German Constitution, it also embodies an objective, normative value 
system within which the constitutional system has to operate.2  
 
Some of these objective, normative values may be found in section 1 of the Constitution, which 
provides that:  
 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b)  Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c)  Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal and adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party   
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
 
As section 1(d) indicates, one of these objectives is democracy. Having emerged from a history 
of discrimination, oppression and the lack of accountability that characterized apartheid South 
Africa, it is hardly surprising that from the outset, the drafters of the Constitution were alive to 
the pressing need for the promotion and strengthening of the principle of democracy. Democracy 
was determined to be essential as a means of ensuring the growth or enhancement, efficacy as 
well as the long-term survival of South Africa’s recent and as yet untested, constitutional 
dispensation.  
 
                                                          
1 P de Vos and W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 25.  
2 W Freedman Understanding the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (2013) 22.  
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Apart from section 1(d), democracy is also referred to in sections 7(1),3 36(1)4 and 39(1)5 of the 
Constitution, all of which form part of the Bill of Rights. The principle of democracy is also 
referred to in a wide range of provisions that deal with the powers and functions of Parliament, 
the provincial legislatures and the municipal councils. All of these provisions are aimed at 
ensuring that Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the municipal councils exercise their 
powers and functions in a manner that promotes democracy.6 
 
Although the principle of democracy is aimed partly at ensuring that the political branches of 
government represent and give effect to the preferences of at least the majority of the voters in an 
open, transparent and accountable manner,7 the Constitution does not rely on the principle of 
democracy alone to achieve this goal. The principle of accountability can also be singled out, 
from among the foundational values and norms enshrined in section 1(d) of the Constitution,  as 
a crucial means of fostering a culture of constitutional democracy within the Republic. This 
principle holds that “in a democracy, government officials; whether elected or appointed by 
those who have been elected, are responsible to the citizenry for their decisions and actions”.8 
 
Just how central this principle is to the preservation of democracy within the Republic becomes 
evident when regard is had to the alarming levels of fraud and corruption that have been reported 
across all three tiers of government during the two decades following the dawn of democracy.9 
This much is corroborated by a Corruption Perception Index report by Transparency 
International which indicates how South Africa (that currently holds a low score of 43 points on 
                                                          
3 Section 7(1) provides that the Bill of Rights is the “cornerstone of democracy in South Africa” and that it 
“enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.  
4 Section 36(1) provides that the “rights in the Bill of Rights may only be limited in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom”. 
5 Section 39(1) provides that when “interpreting the Bill of Rights a court must promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
6 See, for example, sections 57, 70 and 116.  
7 I Currie and J de Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001) 89. 
8 Democracy Web Accountability and Transparency: Essential Principles Available at: 
http://democracyweb.org/accountability-principles (Accessed: 17 January 2018).  
9 G Newham “Why is corruption getting worse in South Africa?” Corruption Watch News (27 January 2014) 
Available at: http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa/ (Accessed: 23 
February 2017).  
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Transparency International’s Index last updated on July of 2018)10 scored 56,80 points in 199611 
but dropped to a record low score of 41 points in 2011.12 This time-frame is relevant for the fact 
that 2011 signalled exactly two years after Mr Zuma ascended into office and is shortly after the 
usage of public funds that, at the time, amounted to R215 million, towards the refurbishment of 
Mr Zuma’s private Nkandla residence, became public knowledge.13 This would seem to suggest 
that the levels of corruption within the country escalated to perhaps the highest level they have 
been since the final years of apartheid under former President Jacob Zuma’s government. The 
reality, however, is that the incidence of corruption is far from being a recent import of 
democracy. Former Speaker of Parliament, Frene Ginwala, has noted how  
 
the country’s post-apartheid government inherited an intrinsically corrupt system of governance; a system 
which did not just disappear into the night on the 27th of April 1994 but which had, at that point, so deeply 
entrenched itself that it inevitably served to corrupt the new order.14 
 
The framers of the Constitution, fresh out of this corrupt apartheid government, clearly perceived 
the threat that both private and public sector corruption would pose on South Africa’s emerging 
democracy. This is why “[t]he Constitution’s scheme, as a whole, poses a duty on the state to set 
up concrete and effective mechanisms to prevent and root out corruption and cognate corrupt 
practices”.15 It does this through putting in place an intricate system of checks and balances 
aimed at consolidating and sustaining democracy within the Republic by fostering 
accountability.  
 
Habib points out in this respect that this, after all, is the essence of democracy as: 
 
                                                          
10 Trading Economics South Africa Corruption Index: 1996 – 2018 Available at: 
https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/corruption-index (Accessed: 5 July 2018). 
11 A score is meant to represent the perceived levels of public sector corruption within a country or particular 
territory from a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).  See Trading Economics South Africa Corruption 
Index: 1996 – 2018 Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/corruption-index (Accessed: 5 July 18). 
12 Trading Economics South Africa Corruption Index: 1996 – 2018. Available at: 
https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/corruption-index (Accessed: 5 July 2018). 
13 The facts concerning the installation of non-security upgrades to Mr Zuma’s private Nkandla residence at 
taxpayer’s expense were brought to light in detail in a newspaper article by the Mail and Guardian published on the 
11th of November 2011 titled: “Bunker bunker time: Zuma’s lavish Nkandla upgrade”.  
14 H Klug “Separation of Powers, Accountability and the role of Independent Constitutional Institutions” 60 New 
York Law School Law Review (2015) 24. 
15 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para 175.  
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Democracy does not assume that responsiveness to citizens is a product of good politicians. Rather, it 
assumes that this may not always be the case, and establishes institutional mechanisms such as opposition 
parties, regular elections and others like the judiciary and the office of the Public Protector, that act as a 
check on elected leaders and ensure that all comply with the collectively determined social compact, the 
Constitution. How well these institutions do this is a measure of the strength of our democracy.16   
 
Among the most experimental of these institutions are the so-called Chapter Nine Institutions,17 
so named due to their textual location in Chapter Nine of the Constitution. These institutions 
include the Office of the Public Protector,18 the South African Human Rights Commission,19 the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities,20 the Commission for Gender Equality,21 the Auditor-General;22 and the Electoral 
Commission.23 Out of all of these Chapter Nine Institutions, perhaps the most prominent is the 
Office of the Public Protector. This is not only because it is placed first on the list of institutions 
established under Chapter Nine, but also because it has a more elaborate history than any of the 
other Chapter Nine Institutions.24 Moreover, it plays an integral role in the ongoing struggle 
against corruption and maladministration in the state,25 which has become a pervasive problem 
within all three spheres of government over the past 15 years.26 
 
In addition, the Office of the Public Protector has also stood out in recent years as a result of a 
number of high-profile investigations involving prominent institutions and individuals and which 
                                                          
16 A Habib The Judiciary in South Africa (2015) v.  
17 S Woolman The Selfless Constitution: Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of South Africa’s Basic 
Law (2013) 271.  
18 Section 181(1)(a) read together with sections 182 and 183. 
19 Section 181(1)(b) read together with section 184. 
20 Section 181(1)(c) read together with sections 185 and 186. 
21 Section 181(1)(d) read together with section 187. 
22 Section 181(1)(e) read together with sections 188 and 189. 
23 Section 181(1)(f) read together with sections 190 and 191. Section 192 also provides that “national legislation 
must establish an independent authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest” and to ensure fairness and a 
diversity of views”. The national legislation referred to in this section is the Independent Communications Authority 
of South Africa Act 2 of 2014. 
24 The institution was first conceived during apartheid under a different name – as the office of the Advocate-
General, in 1979. 
25 H van Vuuren “South Africa: Democracy, Corruption and Conflict Management” (April 2013) 1 Available at: 
http://democracy.cde.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/democracy-works-south-africa-conference-paper-
democracy-corruption-and-conflict-management-by-hennie-van-vuuren-pdf-.pdf (Accessed on 23 February 2017). 
26 G Newham “Why is corruption getting worse in South Africa?” Corruption Watch News (27 January 2014) 
Available at: http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa/ (Accessed on 23 
February 2017).  
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have received a great deal of media coverage. Among the most high profile investigations are the 
2003 Arms Deal Investigation,27 the 2005 PetroSA Investigation,28 the 2010 SAPS 
Investigation,29 the 2013 SABC Investigation,30 and the 2014 Nkandla Investigation.31 
 
From a constitutional law perspective, the most significant investigation has undoubtedly been 
the one into the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of 
Public Works at the President’s private residence in Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal. This is because 
the legal nature of the remedy ordered by the Public Protector ultimately had to be determined by 
the Constitutional Court in its judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly.32 
 
As mentioned above, this investigation was launched after the Public Protector received 
complaints about state expenditure on the installation and implementation of non-security 
measures by the Department of Public Works at the President’s private residence. Following this 
investigation, the Public Protector issued a report in which she found that the President’s failure 
to prevent state expenditure on what were clearly non-security measures at his residence had 
breached sections 96(1),33 96(2)(b)34 and 96(2)(c)35 of the Constitution as well as the Executive 
                                                          
27 Public Protector Report on an investigation by the Public Protector of a complaint by Deputy President J Zuma 
against the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the National Prosecuting Authority in connection with a 
criminal investigation against him Report No. 26 of 2003. 
28 Public Protector Report on an investigation into an allegation of misappropriation of public funds by the 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa, trading as PetroSA, and matters allegedly related thereto 
Report No. 30 of 2005. 
29 Public Protector Against the Rules: Report on an investigation into complaints and allegations of 
maladministration, improper and unlawful conduct, by the Department of Public Works and the South African 
Police Service relating to the leasing of office accommodation in Pretoria Report No. 33 of 2010/11.  
30 Public Protector When Governance and Ethics Fail: Report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration, systemic governance deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi 
Motsoeneng by the South African Broadcasting Corporation Report No. 23 of 2013/2014. 
31 Public Protector Secure in Comfort: Report on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical 
conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at 
and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal province Report 
No. 25 of 2013/14. 
32 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) (hereafter “Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly”). 
33 Section 96(1) provides that “Members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers must act in accordance with a code of 
ethics prescribed by national legislation”. 
34 Section 96(2)(b) provides that “Members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers may not act in any way that is 
inconsistent with their office, or expose themselves to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between their 
official responsibilities and private interests.”  
35 Section 96(2)(c) provides that “Members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers may not use their position … to 
enrich themselves or improperly benefit another person.” 
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Members Ethics Act36 and the Executive Ethics Code.37 After making these findings, the Public 
Protector took remedial action against the President in terms of section 182(1)(c) of the 
Constitution.38 In this respect, she instructed the President to: 
 
11.1.1 Take steps, with the assistance of the National Treasury and the SAPS, to determine the 
reasonable cost of the measures implemented by the DPW [Department of Public Works] at his private 
residence that do not relate to security, and which include [the] visitors’ centre, the amphitheatre, the cattle 
kraal and chicken run and the swimming pool. 
11.1.2   Pay a reasonable percentage of the cost of the measures as determined with the assistance of the 
National Treasury, also considering the DPW apportionment document. 
11.1.3   Reprimand the Ministers involved for the appalling manner in which the Nkandla Project was 
handled and state funds abused. 
11.1.4 Report to the National Assembly on his comments and actions on this report within 14 days. 
 
Acting in terms of paragraph 11.1.4 of the remedial action, the President submitted a report to 
the National Assembly within the 14 day time limit. In this report, however, he denied that he 
had breached the Constitution, the Executive Members Ethics Act or the Executive Ethics Code 
and, consequently, argued that he was not obliged to comply with the remedial action. Apart 
from the report submitted by the President, the Minister of Police and an ad hoc committee 
appointed by the National Assembly also submitted reports, both of which supported the 
approach taken by the President and exonerated him from any liability.  
 
Despite fierce opposition from the Economic Freedom Fighters and the Democratic Alliance, the 
Assembly itself endorsed all three reports and voted to absolve the President of all liability. As a 
result of this decision, the President did not comply with the remedial action taken by the Public 
Protector. The Economic Freedom Fighters and the Democratic Alliance then applied to the 
Constitutional Court for an order, inter alia, declaring that the Public Protector’s remedial action 
was legally binding and compelling the President to comply with it. 
                                                          
36 82 of 1998. 
37 The Executive Ethics Code is issued under the Executive Members Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and prescribes 
standards and rules aimed at promoting open, democratic and accountable government through, inter alia, mandating 
Cabinet Members, Deputy Ministers and MECs to, at all times, act in good faith and in the best interest of good 
governance. 
38 Section 182(1)(c) provides that “The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation, to take 




The Constitutional Court (per Mogoeng CJ; Moseneke DCJ, Bosielo AJ, Cameron J, Froneman 
J, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Mhlantla J, Nkabinde J and Zondo J concurring) 
unanimously granted the order. In arriving at this decision, the Court held that sections 181 and 
182 of the Constitution do not simply confer the power on the Public Protector to make 
recommendations that may be ignored, unless there is a rational reason to do so.39 Instead, it was 
the Constitutional Court’s view that these provisions clearly indicate that the Public Protector’s 
remedial action is legally binding and that when it is binding it may not be ignored by the organ 
of state at whom it is directed.40 The Court felt this had to be so as, in its own words: “the Public 
Protector is one of the most invaluable constitutional gifts to the nation in the fight against 
corruption”.41 
 
From the above discussion, it can be seen how this judgment served to elevate the status of the 
Office of the Public Protector to emerge as the premier institution to strengthen democracy in the 
Republic by promoting accountability through fighting corruption. The institution’s intensified 
efforts at rooting out corruption at the highest echelons of government since 2009,42 when 
Advocate Madonsela took office as the country’s third Public Protector, are also illustrative of 
how the Public Protector has a wider reach or purview in terms of ensuring accountability in 
public administration in comparison with the other Chapter Nine Institutions. This is even more 
so when regard is had to how the Public Protector remains the only Chapter Nine Institution that 
is expressly empowered by the Constitution to take appropriate corrective action against an 
affected organ of state. The Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly could thus have had this in mind when it interpreted section 182(1)(c) to 
mean that the Public Protector does, in fact, have binding remedial power. 
 
This interpretation of the legal nature of the Public Protector’s remedial power has not only 
served to dramatically enhance the authority of the Office of the Public Protector, but has also 
changed the manner in which the Public Protector interacts with other organs of state. Instead of 
                                                          
39 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) at para 70. 
40 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) at para 74.  
41 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) at para 52. 




having to convince other organs of state to co-operate by presenting well-reasoned arguments, 
the Public Protector may now simply instruct them to act. In other words, the Public Protector is 
no longer required to act co-operatively. It may now act coercively. 
 
As Bishop and Woolman point out, however, the fact that the Public Protector had to convince 
other organs of state to be co-operative by presenting well-reasoned arguments was a strength 
and not a weakness. This is because the results would be “infinitely more powerful” if obtained 
through cooperation as opposed to coercion. In addition, it would also allow the National 
Assembly to exercise its oversight function more effectively and participate in and help shape the 
debate around corruption and maladministration.43 
 
The problem with the Constitutional Court’s finding, Bishop et al argue is that it changes the 
relationship between the Public Protector and other organs of state from a constructive to a 
conflictual one. They explain the flaw in the Court’s logic by stating that “if one were rather to 
adopt the approach that remedial action is not binding, but does require a lawful response”, the 
result, they argue, is that it “would avoid the inevitability of [her] decisions being taken on 
review”. On the Constitutional Court’s approach, the focus will be on the Public Protector’s 
decisions and not, necessarily, on the impugned conduct. On the alternative approach, the focus 
will be on the organ of state.44 These criticisms appear to have been confirmed by subsequent 
developments, most notably an increase in the number of decisions being taken on review.45 
 
2. Statement of purpose  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to undertake a critical assessment of the nature of the Public 
Protector’s remedial power in light of the Constitutional Court’s ruling in Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. More particularly, this thesis seeks to set out and 
examine the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of 
                                                          
43 M Bishop and S Woolman “Public Protector” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed 
(Original Service 12-05) at 24A-3. 
44 M Bishop, J Brickhill and K Moshikaro “Constitutional Law” 2016(1) Juta’s Quarterly Review of Law 2 at 2.1.  
45 See for example South African Reserve Bank v Public Protector of the RSA 2017 (6) SA 198 (GP); Minister of 
Home Affairs v Public Protector of the RSA 2017 (2) SA 597 (GP); ABSA Bank Ltd v Public Protector of the RSA 
[2018] 2 All SA 1 (GP); and Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of the RSA 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA).  
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the National Assembly so as to identify and explore the implications of this judgment for the 
relationship between the Office of the Public Protector and other organs of state.  
 
In addition, the purpose of this thesis is to constructively engage with the criticisms that have 
been levelled against the judgment by academic commentators, particularly those set out above. 
As indicated above, some of these criticisms appear to have been confirmed by subsequent 
rulings that have been taken on review. This thesis will however, argue that they are not 
necessarily valid, especially in the context of a dominant party democracy and in light of the 
scourge of corruption and the implications thereof on the sustenance and/or survival of the 
principle of democratic accountability within the Republic. In this regard, special attention shall 
be accorded to three important judicial decisions implicating the Public Protector. These 
decisions are: firstly, the Western Cape High Court’s decision in Democratic Alliance v South 
African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd and Others46 (where the court endorsed a co-operative 
approach between the Office of the Public Protector and organs of state). Thereafter, 
consideration will be given to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s follow-up judgment to this ruling 
in SABC v DA47 (in which the court was in favour of a conflictual approach instead). Finally, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s ruling in Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of the RSA48 
where the Court was in support of the application of the principle of legality for the purposes of 
ascertaining the best approach to implement in the circumstances will be analysed.  
 
3. The research question(s) 
 
The key research question that this dissertation will seek to answer is to set out and examine the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly. This will be done to ascertain the extent to which the judgment has impacted the 
Public Protector’s remedial powers under section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
 
Also flowing from this key research question, is the need to identify and explore the implications 
of this judgment for the relationship between the Office of the Public Protector and other organs 
                                                          
46 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC). 
47 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA). 
48 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA).  
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of state. In so doing, this study will seek to determine whether the Constitutional Court’s position 
that the Public Protector does in fact have the authority to take binding and legally enforceable 
remedial action under the Constitution, furthers, or hinders, the Public Protector’s role in 
contributing to the promotion of accountability in the public administration through combatting 
corruption.   
  
The study shall also set out and engage with the criticisms that have been levelled against the 
judgment by academic commentators – to the effect that non-threatening powers of persuasion49 
enhance the Public Protector’s ability to get government to account for actions taken and 
decisions made – to determine whether they are necessarily valid. This is especially relevant in 
the context of a dominant party democracy, the scourge of corruption, and how these factors 
affect the principle of accountability. In so doing, the study shall also set out and examine 
jurisprudence that has developed around the institution of the Public Protector prior to, and 
following the handing down of the Constitutional Court judgment in Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. The purpose of this is to establish how organs of 
state should respond to the Public Protector’s findings and remedial action.  
 
4. The rationale for the study  
 
Given that the African National Congress (the “ANC”) has won five consecutive national 
elections and with an overwhelming majority on each occasion, it is generally accepted among 
legal and political commentators that South Africa may be characterised as a dominant party 
democracy. Choudry defines a dominant party democracy as one: 
 
which provides an entrenched framework for multiparty democracy through universal suffrage and regular 
elections, and which contemplates political competition and the alternation of political parties in power, but 
in which one party enjoys electoral dominance and continues to win free and fair elections that are not 
tainted by fraud or force.50 
                                                          
49 That is, rather than giving rise to a conflictual one as state organs would now have to litigate against the Public 
Protector if they disagree with her remedial action by contesting her findings by way of judicial review. 
50 S Choudry “He has a mandate: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a 
dominant party democracy” 2009 Constitutional Court Review 11 at 12. See also S Friedman “No easy stroll to 




It is also generally accepted that a dominant party democracy is usually accompanied by a 
number of pathologies. These include the subordination of the parliamentary wing of the 
dominant party to the non-parliamentary wing largely as a result of the principle of party-
discipline; the capturing of important state institutions through mechanisms such as “cadre 
deployment”; and the blurring of the distinction between the state and the party by equating the 
state with the party.51 These pathologies are often accompanied by increasingly high levels of 
corruption and maladministration. As pointed out above, this has certainly been the case in South 
Africa. In this context the normal democratic process of regular elections and the alternation of 
political parties in government cannot be relied on to combat these pathologies. Instead, 
independent institutions such as the courts and, in the case of South Africa, the Chapter Nine 
Institutions and especially the Office of the Public Protector are required to play a more 
prominent role. The rationale for this study, therefore, is to locate the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and the criticisms 
that have been levelled against it within this broader context. 
 
5. The research methodology of the study 
 
This is a desktop study which adopts a positivist approach to its subject. It is, therefore, based 
largely on a critical analysis of primary and secondary materials in order to identify 
contradictions, inconsistencies, lacunae and trends in the relevant field. The primary and 
secondary materials that will be analyzed in this study include law reports, statutes, journal 
articles, reports, textbooks and internet websites. 
 
6. The structure of the study  
 
The study is divided into four chapters. Chapter One will serve as an introductory chapter. Its 
main purpose is to put the study into perspective. It thus seeks to provide a contextual 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
embrace: One party domination and democracy (1999) at 97 and P du Toit and N de Jager Friend or foe? Dominant 
party systems in Southern Africa: Insights from the developing world (2013) at 7. 
51 JW Jaftha The role of the South African Constitutional Court in safeguarding democracy by ensuring the effective 
operation of the separation of powers Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Cape Town (2018) at 50. 
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understanding of the main subject matter of the thesis. This chapter briefly touches on the most 
important court ruling thus far on the Public Protector’s powers while also stating the purpose 
and rationale for the study, given the Public Protector’s far-reaching decisions and the judiciary’s 
endorsement of the binding nature of these decisions.  
 
Chapter Two will seek to locate the position, status and purpose of Chapter Nine institutions in 
general, and of the Office of the Public Protector in particular, within South Africa’s current 
constitutional order in light of what the Constitution provides as well as with due regard to the 
statutory national legislative framework that has been put in place to regulate the Public 
Protector’s powers. With regard to the latter, primary focus will be placed on the Public 
Protector Act. The Public Protector’s investigatory procedures as set out under the Public 
Protector Act shall also be examined. Additional legislation that confers further powers on the 
Office of the Public Protector will also be considered. 
 
Chapter Three will closely examine the jurisprudence of the courts that has developed around the 
Office of the Public Protector. This chapter essentially serves as a means of establishing 
jurisprudential background to proceedings that eventually culminated in the handing down of the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. 
It shall do so by first engaging in a brief discussion of the 2011 Public Protector of the RSA v 
Mail and Guardian case52 which is significant due to the remarks made by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in this instance with regard to the proper interpretation of the institution’s investigatory 
role under the Constitution. More importantly, the chapter seeks to closely examine the 
conflicting judgments around the legal nature of the Public Protector’s remedial power and the 
review of the Public Protector’s exercise of such power. Particular attention shall thus be paid to 
the Western Cape High Court’s decision in Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in South African Broadcasting 
Corporation v Democratic Alliance. Special attention will be accorded to the Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly ruling as this was the first time that the highest 
court in the land gave a positive affirmation of the Public Protector’s powers under the 
Constitution. Following that is yet another Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Minister of 
                                                          
52 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA). 
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Home Affairs v Public Protector of South Africa. This shall be done in order to establish the 
appropriate manner in which the institution should relate with organs of state in order to more 
effectively and efficiently ensure public accountability in daily administration.  
 
Finally, Chapter Four will serve as the analysis and conclusion chapter. Essentially, this chapter 
will seek to engage with the criticisms that have been levelled against the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. It shall show that 
these criticisms are not necessarily valid in light of South Africa’s current political landscape, 
which has been characterised by a dominant party dynamic since the advent of constitutional 
democracy. It shall also examine the means through which the betterment or strengthening of 
















CHAPTER TWO: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As we saw in Chapter One of this thesis, the constitutional principles of democracy and 
accountability are key characteristics of South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional order.53 An 
important consequence of these principles is that the Constitution does not only seek to structure, 
but also to constrain, state power.54 In order to achieve these goals, the Constitution contains 
structural, procedural and substantive mechanisms all of which regulate the manner in which 
public power may be exercised. Among the structural and procedural mechanisms encompassed 
by the Constitution are: 
• the principle of the separation of powers; 
• the principle of multi-sphere government; and  
• the principle of co-operative government. 
 
Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for the principle of the separation of 
powers, the Constitutional Court had held on several occasions that there is no doubt that it does 
form part of South Africa’s system of constitutional governance and that law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the principle is invalid.55 A self-standing adjunct to the principle of the 
separation of powers doctrine is the principle of multi-sphere government. Somewhat similar to 
the separation of powers which requires a vertical division of power between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of government, multi-sphere government requires a horizontal 
division of power between the national, provincial and local spheres of government.56 
                                                          
53 H Klug “Separation of Powers, Accountability and the role of Independent Constitutional Institutions” 60 New 
York Law School Law Review (2015) 154. 
54 I Currie and J de Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001) 10.  
55 In SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) at para 22 the Constitutional Court 
held that separation of powers is an unexpressed provision that is “implied” in or “implicit” to the Constitution and 
that its presence is based on the fact that the Constitution draws a distinction between the legislative, executive and 
judicial functions. In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 
(CC) at paras 37-38 the Court also held that “the constitutional principle of separation of powers is not merely an 
abstract notion but is reflected in the very structure of government as seen through the provisions entrusting and 
separating powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches” and in Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC) at para 28 that “[i]t is by now axiomatic that the doctrine 
of separation of powers is part of our constitutional design”. 




Unlike the principle of the separation of powers, the principle of multi-sphere government is 
expressly provided for by the Constitution. The most significant provision in this respect is 
section 40(1), which provides that “[i]n the Republic, government is constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated.” 
 
It is important to note, however, that the term “government” in section 40(1) is employed in a 
somewhat unusual manner. This is because it refers only to the legislative and executive 
branches of government and not to the judicial branch. The horizontal division of power between 
the national, provincial and local spheres, therefore, applies only to the legislature and the 
executive. It does not apply to the judiciary, which remains a national institution. 
 
Although legislative and executive power is divided among the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government, this division is not intended to promote competition among the three 
spheres, but rather co-operation. Section 40(2) of the Constitution thus provides that “[a]ll 
spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles in [Chapter Three] and must 
conduct their activities within the parameters that the Chapter provides.”  
 
The principles of co-operative government referred to in section 40(2) are contained in section 
41(1)(a) to (h) that inter alia, provides that all spheres of government and all organs of state 
within each sphere must be loyal to the Constitution and the Republic.57 This provision is 
qualified by the requirements that each sphere must not assume any power or function except 
those conferred on them by the Constitution;58 and must provide effective, transparent, 
accountable and coherent government, and co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good 
faith.59 
 
Unfortunately, the structural and procedural restrictions imposed by these principles have been 
undermined by the fact that the South African political system has been dominated by the ANC 
                                                          
57 Section 41(1)(a). 
58 Section 41(1)(e). 
59 Section 41(1)(h). 
17 
 
and that the ANC practices a form of strict party discipline.60 As a result of these factors, 
Parliament’s role as watchdog over the policies and practices of the executive has been 
weakened.61  Notable examples of the corrosive effect that the dominant party dynamic has on 
Parliament’s role as a mechanism for fostering accountability in public administration have been 
illustrated in the manner in which Parliament dealt with “Travelgate”.62 More recently, this has 
also been seen when ANC-aligned members of Parliament chose not to hold former President 
Jacob Zuma accountable for the manner in which state funds were abused in the installation of 
non-security comforts at his private Nkandla homestead.63 In addition, it has been demonstrated 
                                                          
60 The ANC currently occupies 249 out of a total of 400 seats in the National Assembly, which translates into a 
62.25% majority in the more powerful “lower house” of Parliament. See: South African Government News Agency 
2014 Elections: Seats in Parliament.10 May 2014 Available at: http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/2014-
elections-seats-parliament (Accessed: 8 August 2016).  
61 H Klug “Separation of Powers, Accountability and the role of Independent Constitutional Institutions”  60 New 
York Law School Law Review (2015) 156. 
62 In the “Travelgate” scandal, members of Parliament, most of them high ranking members of the ruling ANC 
party, were charged with abusing parliamentary travel warrants thereby defrauding Parliament of millions of rands. 
In August 2011, the Speaker Max Sisulu revealed that parliament had failed to recoup some R12 million owed to it 
by errant MPs and had decided to write the debt off on the basis that it would cost more to recover the 
misappropriated funds. Parliament’s integrity was severely compromised as a result due to its failure to resolve the 
“Travelgate” saga through a speedy judicial process and to institute criminal proceedings against directly implicated 
MPs and to compel them to repay the money they owed.  See: L Donelly High flyers among “Travelgate” MPs Mail 
and Guardian 12 August 2014 Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2011-08-12-highflyers-among-travelgate-mps 
(Accessed: 6 July 2018). On the opposite end of the spectrum was the ANC’s response to the scandal. Despite the 
ANC National Executive Committee issuing a statement on 19 September 2004 indicating that the party would 
institute disciplinary proceedings against any of its MPs found guilty of wrongdoing with regards to “Travelgate”, 
the party instead promoted 7 of its high ranking party members implicated in the scandal. One such notable example 
is Bathabile Dhlamini; one of “Travelgate’s” biggest offenders – pleading guilty to fraud amounting to R254 000. 
Despite this, she was later elected first as deputy minister of social development in 2009 then as minister of social 
development after a dramatic cabinet reshuffle in October 2010. This granting of political protection to high ranking 
party officials found guilty of fraud and corruption through subsequent promotion to senior positions in government 
gives rise to the potential conflict between the exercise of Parliament’s constitutional duty of scrutinizing and 
overseeing executive action and loyalty to the government as the relevant MP would then feel compelled to, at all 
times, toe the party line in order to keep their post. See G van Onselen “7 of the worst: How the ANC rewards 
corruption” Inside Politics 27 June 2012 Available at: https://inside-politics.org/2012/06/27/7-of-the-worst-how-the-
anc-rewards-corruption/ (Accessed: 7 July 2018). 
63 See, for example, Public Protector Secure in Comfort: Report on an investigation into allegations of impropriety 
and unethical conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of 
Public Works at and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal 
province Report No. 25 of 2013/14. The Public Protector’s subsequent report into allegations of corruption, 
maladministration, improper and unethical conduct relating to the handling of the Nkandla project essentially found 
that the President’s conduct in this instance had been improper and flouted a number of his obligations under the 
Constitution. Parliament should have facilitated the enforcement of this report as per its constitutional mandate 
under section 42(3) of the Constitution which provides that: “[T]he National Assembly is elected to represent the 
people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution … by passing legislation” and, more 
significantly, “by scrutinizing and overseeing executive action”. However, the National Assembly adopted and 
endorsed a parallel process to that of the Office of the Public Protector which essentially absolved the President of 
all wrongdoing concerning the excessive runaway costs of extending his private home. This, in turn, emboldened the 
President to ultimately not comply with any of the corrective steps prescribed in the Public Protector’s report.  
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in the manner in which Mr Zuma survived several no-confidence motions against him during his 
tenure as President, largely due to the existence of pro-Zuma loyalists within Parliament.  
 
Section 102 of the Constitution makes provision for the President’s removal through the passing 
of a no-confidence motion by a majority of the members of Parliament where Parliament has lost 
confidence in the President’s continued leadership of the Republic. During his time as President, 
Mr Zuma faced a total of six motions of no confidence; 2 of which were unsuccessful – one was 
amended and the other withdrawn.64 The most recent vote of no confidence against Mr Zuma 
was on the 8th of August 2017 and was, for the first time, held by secret ballot.65 He survived, 
having obtained a total of 198 votes against the motion, 177 votes for, and 9 abstentions.66 Mr 
Zuma was thus able to once again remain in office despite his scandal-ridden Presidency.67  
 
It is against this backdrop that the need for, and utility of, independent institutions of governance 
that are not easily susceptible to capture by the executive or the ruling party, becomes evident. 
The revolutionary nature of South Africa’s Constitution consequently lies in the 
constitutionalizing of a set of independent institutions under Chapter Nine of the Constitution, 
whose role is to uphold the progressive vision of the Constitution while simultaneously ensuring 
that there are multiple avenues for democratic and legal contestation.68 
                                                          
64 K Wilkinson “Fact Sheet: How many motions of no-confidence has Zuma faced?” Eyewitness News 29 June 2017 
Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/29/fact-sheet-how-many-motions-of-no-confidence-has-zuma-faced 
(Accessed: 6 July 2018).  
65 K Wilkinson “Fact Sheet: How many motions of no-confidence has Zuma faced?” Eyewitness News 29 June 2017 
Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/29/fact-sheet-how-many-motions-of-no-confidence-has-zuma-faced 
(Accessed: 6 July 2018). 
66 K Wilkinson “Fact Sheet: How many motions of no-confidence has Zuma faced?” Eyewitness News 29 June 2017 
Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/29/fact-sheet-how-many-motions-of-no-confidence-has-zuma-faced 
(Accessed: 6 July 2018). 
67 This motion of no-confidence was held just months after Mr Zuma’s surprise cabinet reshuffle that was dubbed as 
a “midnight ministerial massacre”. Among those placed on the chopping block were former Finance Minister Pravin 
Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas who were unceremoniously sacked. This almost instantaneously caused the 
South African currency to plummet with many fearing that ratings agencies would downgrade the country to junk 
status. By that stage, Mr Zuma’s government was being blamed for corruption spiralling out of control; 
unemployment reaching unprecedented levels; the politicization and weakening of independent state institutions as 
well as the attempted capture of the state as emerged from the Public Protector’s State of Capture report. Yet despite 
these warranted concerns, and their implications on the efficacy of constitutional democracy within the Republic and 
on the continued survival of the country’s broader constitutional project, loyal ANC members of Parliament, who 
constitute the majority of the members of the National Assembly, steadfastly stood by Mr Zuma. 
68 H Klug Poverty, Good Governance and Achieving the Constitution’s promise Speech delivered at the Good 
Governance Conference held in Pretoria on 22 October 2013 Available at: 




The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to set out the legal framework governing these Chapter 
Nine Institutions in general and the Office of the Public Protector in particular by closely 
examining relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. Before doing so, however, it will be 
helpful to set out the background and history of the concept of an Ombudsman in order to 
analyse the Office of the Public Protector within its proper context. 
 
2. The institution of the Ombudsman 
 
As the Constitutional Court indicated in the First Certification Judgment, the Office of the 
Public Protector is “modelled on the institution of the ombudsman, whose function is to ensure 
that government officials carry out their tasks effectively, fairly and without corruption or 
prejudice.”69 
 
Murray defines the ombudsman somewhat simplistically as a state institution located outside 
government with the power to investigate governmental affairs on behalf of citizens.70 A more 
sophisticated and widely accepted definition is provided by the International Bar Association, 
which defines the institution as: 
 
an office that receives complaints from aggrieved persons against government agencies, officials and 
employees or who acts on his own motion, and who has the power to investigate, recommend corrective 
action and issue reports.71 
 
In light of these definitions, therefore, it may be said that the ombudsman institution commonly 
operates as an independent oversight mechanism charged with the receipt and investigation of 
complaints about administrative action and decisions in the delivery of government services.72 In 
this respect, the ombudsman operates as an agent or representative of the people, imbued with a 
                                                          
69 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 
(4) SA 744 (CC) 161 (hereafter the First Certification Judgment). 
70 C Murray “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions” 6(2) 
PELJ (2006) 123.   
71 L Reif (ed) The International Ombudsman Yearbook: Volume 6 (2002) 79.  
72A Brock and A Devenish “Africa could lead the way on rights” Sunday Tribune 26 March 2017. 
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unique capacity to tackle wider problems of maladministration and poor governance and the 
resolution of injuries suffered by ordinary citizens as a result.73 
 
In order to achieve these goals, an ombudsman is frequently endowed with the power to embark 
upon an independent and impartial investigation and thereafter propose suitable remedies to 
redress the injustice that would have occurred. In addition, he or she can make recommendations 
to the relevant prosecuting authorities to take action against an official. Apart from these powers, 
an ombudsman is often given the power to negotiate or mediate between the parties as part of 
methods to resolve the problem.74 
 
The institution of the ombudsman, therefore, has a dual role: that of facilitator (through receiving 
and investigating complaints) and agent for change – through recommendations for change on 
policies and procedures.75 It is in this light that the Asian Development Bank has described it as 
“the most popular contemporary innovation in the field of administrative accountability”.76 
 
Not surprisingly, the popularity of the ombudsman institution has increased exponentially over 
time due to the necessity and the obvious utility of the institution as illustrated above.  Over the 
years, it has also moved away from its classical conception to a flood of new ombudsman offices 
whose jurisdiction ranges from the general (such as the Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman 
and the British Parliamentary Commissioner), to the specialist (such as the Canadian 
Commissioner of Official Languages and the military ombudsmen in Sweden, Norway and 
Germany).77 
                                                          
73 L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 279. 
74 Namibia Ombudsman Mandates of the Office of the Ombudsman Available at: 
https://www.ombudsman.org.na/mandates-of-the-office-of-the-ombudsman/ (Accessed: 13 October 2016). 
75 The role of the Ombudsman The Ombudsmen Website Available at: www.ombudsmen.co.za (Accessed: 7 April 
2017).  
76 Transparency International Best Practices for Ombudsmen Available at:  
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Helpdesk_answer_Best_Practices_for_Ombusdman_Office
s.pdf (Accessed: 13 October 2016).  
77 L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 282. In the South African context, a number of specialist ombudsman 
institutions have also emerged. These include the Office of the South African Military Ombud which serves as an 
independent, external mechanism to deal with grievances and complaints, either by members of the public regarding 
the official conduct of a member of the SANDF or by members and former members of the SANDF in respect of 
conditions of service (see South African Military Ombud Website Available at: http://milombud.org/ (Accessed: 31 
October 2016)); the Office of the Police Ombudsman whose role includes monitoring police conduct and overseeing 




The origins of the institution of the ombudsman are usually traced back to the abdication of King 
Gustav IV of Sweden on 29 March 1809 and the adoption of a new Constitution by the Swedish 
Parliament shortly thereafter. One of the goals of this Constitution was to give Parliament control 
over the executive and in order to help accomplish this goal the Constitution provided for the 
appointment of the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsman).78 The function of this 
representative of Parliament was to monitor the manner in which all members of the executive 
complied with the law and to report back on this issue to Parliament. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman therefore, served as a buffer between disgruntled citizens and the government, in 
support of Parliament.79  
 
From Sweden the concept of an ombudsman spread, first to other Scandinavian countries, 
starting with Finland in 1919,80 and from there to various Commonwealth countries, starting with 
New Zealand in 1962.81 In Africa, the first country to appoint an ombudsman was Tanzania in 
1966, followed by Mauritius in 1968 and Ghana in 1969.  
  
In South Africa the first ombudsman was appointed in 1979 in terms of the Advocate-General 
Act82 and was known as the Advocate-General.83 Section 4(1) of this Act was the enabling 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ombudsman Available at: https://www.westerncape.gov.za/police-ombudsman (Accessed: 31 October 2016)) and 
the Office of the Health Ombudsman which is intended to address, amongst others, complaints against health 
practitioners (See Health Professions Council of South Africa About HPCSA: Organizational Structure Available at: 
http://www.hpcsa.co.za/OrgStructure/OmbudsmanOffice (Accessed: 31 October 2016)). There are also numerous 
offices of the Ombud at various institutions of higher learning across the country. 
78 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 26. 
79 Public Protector Address to the Law Society of South Africa during the Annual General Meeting of the Law 
Society at the Windmill Casino and Entertainment Centre in Bloemfontein on 29 March 2014 Available at: 
http://www.pprotect.org/media_gallery/2014/29032014_sp.asp (Accessed:  14 May 2016). See also L Reif The 
Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System (2004) 5 and L Reif. (ed) The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook Volume 6 (2002) 79. 
80 See Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and 
Associated Institutions: A report to the National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa (31 July 2007)  
Available at: 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/Report%20of%20the%20Ad%20Hoc%20Committee%20of%20chap
ter%209.%202007.pdf (Accessed: 10 April  2016).  
81 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and 
Associated Institutions: A report to the National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa (31 July 2007)  
Available at: 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/Report%20of%20the%20Ad%20Hoc%20Committee%20of%20chap
ter%209.%202007.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
82 118 of 1979. 
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provision and it conferred on the Advocate-General the power to investigate the improper or 
unlawful use of public money on receipt of a complaint.84 Given these severely limited powers, 
the Office of the Advocate-General was no more than a specialist ombudsman.85 
 
The Advocate-General Act was repealed and replaced in 1983 by the Ombudsman Act.86 Section 
11 of this Act was the enabling provision and when it was first enacted it conferred the power on 
the Advocate-General to identify deficiencies in legislation and other official measures and to 
refer these deficiencies to Parliament or the appropriate authority together with recommendations 
as to how they could be remedied.87 Section 11, however, was extensively amended in 1991 and 
the powers of the Ombudsman were extended to include matters in respect of which “the State of 
the public in general is being prejudiced by maladministration in connection with the affairs of 
the State”. At the same time, the name of the Office was officially changed from that of 
Advocate-General to that of Ombudsman.88 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
83 M Montesh The Functioning of Ombudsman (Public Protector) in South Africa: Redress and Checks and 
Balances?  Available at: http://www.rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/34 (Accessed: 10 April 2016).  
84 M Montesh The Functioning of Ombudsman (Public Protector) in South Africa: Redress and Checks and 
Balances? Available at: http://www.rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/34 (Accessed: 10 April 2016). See also S 
Woolman The Selfless Constitution: Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of South Africa’s Basic Law 
(2013) 274. 
85
 AS Mathews  Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law: Dilemmas of the Apartheid Society (1986) 168. See 
also G Barrie “The Public Protector” De Rebus (September 1995) 581. Available at: 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/journal_archive/02500329/8263.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2016). The 
limited powers of the Advocate-General may be traced back to the fact that this Office was established in response 
to the so-called “Information Scandal” which broke out in the late 1970s. This scandal, which was also known as 
“Infogate”, “Rhoodiegate” or “Muldergate”, arose out of the  unlawful use of public money by the then Department 
of Information to fund secret projects, including the creation of the Citizen Newspaper. After these unlawful 
activities were publically revealed, the National Party Government agreed to establish a permanent structure to 
investigate the improper or unlawful use of public funds (see M Montesh The Functioning of Ombudsman (Public 
Protector) in South Africa: Redress and Checks and Balances? Available at: 
http://www.rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/34 (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
86 110 of 1983. 
87 M Montesh The Functioning of Ombudsman (Public Protector) in South Africa: Redress and Checks and 
Balances? Available at: http://www.rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/34 (Accessed: 10 April 2016). See also C 
Murray, “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions?”  6(2) 
PELJ (2006) 123.  
88 M Montesh The Functioning of Ombudsman (Public Protector) in South Africa: Redress and Checks and 
Balances?  Available at: http://www.rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/34 (Accessed: 10 April 2016). See also 
C Murray, “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions?”  6(2) 
PELJ (2006) 123.  
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Following the transition to democracy, the Ombudsman Act was repealed and replaced in 1994 
by the Public Protector Act.89 This Act was passed in order to give effect to sections 110 to 114 
of the Interim Constitution.90 These sections were part of a suite of constitutional provisions 
located in Chapter Eight and aimed at creating several independent state institutions, including 
the Public Protector,91 the Human Rights Commission,92 the Commission on Gender Equality93 
and the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights.94 
 
Apart from creating the Office of the Public Protector and regulating the appointment, 
independence and staff of the Public Protector, sections 110 to 114, and especially section 112, 
conferred wide powers on the Public Protector, including the power to investigate allegations of 
abuse of power, corruption, maladministration and even rudeness. Section 112(1)(a) provided in 
this respect that: 
 
(1) … in addition to any powers and functions assigned to him or her by any law, [the Public Protector] 
shall be competent: 
(a)  to investigate, on his or her own initiative, or on receipt of a complaint: 
(i)  allegations of maladministration with the affairs of government at any level; 
(ii)  abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, discourteous or other improper 
conduct or undue delay by a person performing a public function; 
(iii)  improper or dishonest act, or omission or corruption, with respect to public money; 
(iv)  improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper advantage, or promise of such 
enrichment or advantage, by a person as a result of an act or omission in the public administration or 
in connection with the affairs of government at any level or of a person performing a public 
function; or 
(v)  act or omission by a person in the employ of government at any level, or a person performing a 
public function, which results in unlawful or improper prejudice to any other person.95 
                                                          
89 23 of 1994. 
90 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (hereafter, the “Interim Constitution”). 
91 Sections 110 to 114. The drafters of the Interim Constitution chose the name Public Protector, rather than 
Ombudsman because of the gender connotations of the latter term (see M Montesh The Functioning of Ombudsman 
(Public Protector) in South Africa: Redress and Checks and Balances? Available at: 
http://www.rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/34 (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
92 Sections 115 to 118. 
93 Sections 119 and 120. 
94 Section 121 to 123. 
95 Section 112(1)(a) Available at:  
http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/documents/South%20Africa/Legislation/Constitution%20of%20South




Besides these powers, section 112(1)(b) and (c) also conferred the power on the Public Protector 
to take a number of remedial steps. It provided in this respect that the Public Protector is 
empowered: 
 
(b)  to endeavour, in his or her sole discretion, to resolve any dispute or rectify any act or omission by:  
(i)  mediation, conciliation, or negotiation;  
(ii)  advising, where necessary, any complainant regarding appropriate remedies; or 
(iii)  any other means that may be expedient in the circumstances; or  
(c)  at any time prior to, during or after an investigation: 
(i)  if he or she is of the opinion that the facts disclose the commission of an offence by any person, to 
bring the matter to the notice of the relevant authority charged with prosecutions;  
(ii)  or if he or she deems it advisable, to refer any matter which has a bearing on an investigation, to 
the appropriate public body or authority affected by it or to make an appropriate recommendation 
regarding the redress of the prejudice resulting therefrom or make any other appropriate 
recommendation he or she deems expedient to the affected public body or authority.96 
 
Although the Interim Constitution instituted an Office with an expanded mandate, role and 
jurisdiction, the Public Protector’s powers under the Interim Constitution could still be regarded 
as being essentially non-threatening. This is seen mostly in the types of remedies that were 
available to the Public Protector. In terms of section 112(1)(b) the Public Protector could only 
“endeavour” to resolve a dispute or to rectify any act or omission. The use of the word 
“endeavour” indicated that the Public Protector was not required to take an active or direct role, 
but merely to be seen to have made some sort of an effort as far as redressing the mischief 
contemplated under section 112(1)(a) of the Interim Constitution was concerned.  
 
The Public Protector could endeavour to address such matters through the use of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms listed under section 112(1)(b). Accordingly, the Public Protector 
could render advice that could be used in ascertaining the appropriate remedy in the 
circumstances; refer any material findings of his or her investigations to the appropriate 
authorities as well as make appropriate recommendations, which, by virtue of them being mere 
                                                          
96 Section 112(1)(b) Available at:  
http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/documents/South%20Africa/Legislation/Constitution%20of%20South
%20Africa%201993.pdf (Accessed: 13 April 2016). 
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recommendations, were open to being disregarded or not being implemented at all. In short, the 
Public Protector could not take any binding remedial action on any person or organ of state.  
 
The Interim Constitution fell away with the coming into force of the Constitution.97 The 
provisions governing the Office of the Public Protector are now set out in sections 181 to 183 
and 193 to 194. Apart from establishing the Office of the Public Protector and regulating the 
independence, appointment and removal of the Public Protector, these sections, and especially 
section 182, also confer wide investigatory and remedial powers on the Public Protector. Section 
182 provides in this respect that: 
 
(1) The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation: 
(a)  to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of 
government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice;  
(b)  to report on that conduct; and 
(c) to take appropriate remedial action.98 
 
3. The constitutional framework 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The constitutional provisions that govern the Office of the Public Protector may be divided into 
two categories: first, those that apply to all of the Chapter Nine Institutions; 99 and, second, those 
that apply specifically to the Public Protector.100 The first category deal with the independence of 
the Chapter Nine Institutions and the appointment and removal of the Office-Bearers and 
Commissioners in question.101 The second category deals with the powers, functions and term of 
office of the Public Protector.102 Each of these different aspects will be discussed in turn, starting 
with the independence of the Chapter Nine Institutions. 
 
                                                          
97 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter, the “Constitution”). 
98 Section 182(1) (a), (b) and (c). 
99 See sections 181, 193 and 194. 
100 See sections 182 and 183. 
101 See sections 181, 193 and 194 respectively. 
102 See sections 182 and 183 respectively. 
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3.2 The independence of the Chapter Nine Institutions 
 
The independence of the Chapter Nine Institutions is governed by sections 181(2) to 181(4) of 
the Constitution. Section 181(2) begins in this respect by providing that “[t]hese institutions are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and 
exercise their powers without fear, favour or prejudice”. Section 181(3) goes on to impose an 
obligation on other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, to “assist and protect 
[the Chapter Nine Institutions] to ensure their “independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness” and, finally, section 181(4) prohibits persons and organs of state interfering with 
the functioning of any Chapter Nine Institution. 
 
As Murray has pointed out, the Constitution asserts the independence of the Chapter Nine 
Institutions in strong terms, using language virtually identical to that used to declare the 
independence of the courts.103 Given this fact, it is not surprising that the Constitutional Court 
has also asserted the independence of the Chapter Nine Institutions in strong terms. In 
Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality,104 for example, the Constitutional 
Court held that although the Independent Electoral Commission (the “IEC”) was clearly an organ 
of state as defined in section 239 of the Constitution,105 it was not an organ of state located 
within the government and especially not within the national sphere of government, as was 
argued. Instead, it is located outside the government in much the same way as the courts are.106 
 
In arriving at this decision, the Constitutional Court relied heavily on the fact that there is 
nothing in the Constitution which indicates that the IEC is part of the national sphere of 
government. It further relied on the fact that the Constitution expressly describes the IEC as an 
independent institution. Finally, it held that it would be contradictory to regard an independent 
institution as forming part of the national sphere of government when the Constitution 
specifically provides that all three spheres are interdependent and interrelated.107 
                                                          
103 C Murray “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions” 6(2) 
PELJ (2006) 126-127.  
104 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC). 
105 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) at para 22. 
106 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) at para 27. 




Apart from confirming that while the Chapter Nine Institution are part of the state, they are not 
part of the government, the Constitutional Court has also held that the independent status of these 
institutions has certain practical consequences. One of these is that the Chapter Nine Institutions 
must have a certain degree of financial independence in order to operate exclusively and to be 
able to perform their duties without fear, favour or prejudice. In the Langebaan Municipality 
case, the Constitutional Court held that although this does not mean that they can set their 
budgets independently from Parliament, it does mean that they must be provided funding directly 
by Parliament and that the amount of funding allocated to them must be reasonable.108 
 
Another consequence is that the Chapter Nine Institutions must have a certain degree of 
administrative independence in order to operate effectively. In New National Party v 
Government of the RSA,109 the Constitutional Court held that although the government is obliged 
to support the Chapter Nine Institutions, it is not entitled to interfere in the daily activities of 
these institutions, particularly in respect of the development and implementation of their 
programmes. In addition, the government is also not entitled to interfere in the employment and 
management of staff by these institutions.110 Most recently, in Economic Freedom Fighters v 
Speaker of the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court held that the “[c]hapter Nine 
Institutions were created to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic” and further that 
“[t]o achieve this crucial objective, they are required to be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law; to be impartial and to exercise their powers and functions without fear, 
favour and prejudice”.111 
 
Finally, it is also important to note that the independence of the Chapter Nine Institutions is 
further guaranteed in the appointment and removal procedures of Chapter Nine office bearers. 
These are dealt with under sections 193 and 194 of the Constitution.  
 
3.3 The appointment and removal of Chapter Nine Office-Bearers and Commissioners 
                                                          
108 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) at para 29. 
109 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC). 
110 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) at para 29. 




The appointment and removal of the Chapter Nine Office-Bearers and Commissioners are 
governed by sections 193 and 194 respectively. Section 193(1) begins in this respect by 
providing that: 
  
[t]he Public Protector and the members of [the Chapter Nine Commissions] must be men or women who:  
(a)  are South African citizens;112  
(b)  are fit and proper to hold the particular office;113 and  
(c)  comply with any other requirements prescribed by national legislation.114 
 
Apart from the appointment criteria set out above, sections 193(4) and 193(5) of the Constitution 
also set out the procedure that must be followed when the Public Protector, the Auditor-General 
and the members of the South African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender 
Equality and the Electoral Commission are appointed.115 Section 193(4) provides in this respect 
that the President must appoint these Office-Bearers and Commissioners on the recommendation 
of the National Assembly, and section 193(5) provides that the National Assembly must 
recommend persons: 
 
(a)  nominated by a committee of the Assembly proportionally composed of members of all parties 
represented in the Assembly;116 and 
(b)  approved by the Assembly by a resolution with a supporting vote: 
(i)  of at least 60 percent of the members of the National Assembly, if the recommendation concerns the 
appointment of the Public Protector or the Auditor-General; or  
(ii)  of a majority of the members of the Assembly, if the recommendation concerns the appointment of a 
members of a commission.117 
                                                          
112 Section 193(1)(a). 
113 Section 193(1)(b). 
114 Section 193(1)(c). Section 193(2) and (3) provide further that the members of the Chapter Nine Commissions 
must also reflect broadly the race and gender composition of South Africa and that the Auditor-General must have 
specialised knowledge of, or experience in, auditing state finances and administration. Neither of these provisions 
applies to the Public Protector. 
115 The appointment of the members of the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities is governed by section 11 of the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002. This section essentially 
provides that the members must be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Assembly.  
116 Section 193(5)(a). 
117 As can be seen from section 193(5)(b) cited above, a higher threshold is constitutionally prescribed only in 




In other words, the person appointed as the Public Protector must be nominated by a committee 
of the National Assembly made up of all the parties in the Assembly in proportion to their 
strength and this recommendation must be approved by at least 60 percent of the members of the 
National Assembly. This person must then be appointed by the President as the Public Protector.  
 
According to Murray, these special provisions were put in place to secure their independence. As 
she states: the Constitution (in requiring their appointment to only be upon the adoption of a 
unique parliamentary majority and further that the appointees be selected by a parliamentary 
committee comprised of members from all the political parties represented within the National 
Assembly), ensures that public officials command broad political support and are not merely the 
cronies of the governing party.118 This is even more relevant in respect of the “dominant party 
democracy” that South Africa is which inadvertently necessitates the need for these institutions 
to be seen as not being partisan.119 
 
Insofar as the removal of the Chapter Nine Office-Bearers and Commissioners is concerned, 
section 194(1) provides that these persons may be removed from office only: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
threshold applies for the removal of both office holders which in both instances can only be at the adoption of a two-
thirds majority by Parliament as opposed to the support of a simple majority of National Assembly members for the 
other Chapter Nine institutions. It becomes useful to understand why this had to be so particularly in respect of the 
Public Protector Office which forms the main focus of this study. The two certification judgments by the 
Constitutional Court present a good starting point. Of note, among the reasons why the first draft of South Africa’s 
post-apartheid constitution was rejected by the Constitutional Court in the First Certification judgment  was that it 
failed, in respect of the Public Protector, to provide adequately for the independence of this institution as 
contemplated by Constitutional Principle XXIX whose emphatic wording was such that the independence and 
impartiality of the Public Protector must not only be provided for, but must also be safeguarded by the Constitution 
in the interests of the maintenance of effective administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the public 
service. In considering the amended text in the Second Certification judgment (Ex Parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) ) at para 142 it was asserted that “[i]nherent in the functions of the Public 
Protector is the investigation of sensitive and potentially embarrassing affairs of government which requires its 
independence and impartiality to be beyond question, and to be protected by stringent provisions in the 
Constitution” (emphasis added). It is thus in the nature of the functions that this institution has to perform through 
the delicate nature of the matters open to investigation by the Public Protector due to the political clout of the 
individuals that can find themselves the subject of such investigations – whose first instinct may not necessarily be 
that of cooperating with the institution where adverse or unfavorable findings have been made; that it becomes easy 
to see why the office of the Public Protector cannot be expected to function optimally, nor its findings to be taken 
seriously, where it exists and operates within a weak constitutional or statutory framework. 
118 C Murray “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions” 6(2) 
PELJ (2006) 126-127. 
119 C Murray “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions” 6(2) 




(a)  if a committee of the National Assembly has found such a person to be guilty of misconduct, 
incapacity or incompetence; and 
(b)  the National Assembly has adopted a resolution calling for that person’s removal from office. 
 
Section 194(2) provides further that a resolution of the National Assembly calling for the 
removal from office of the Public Protector or the Auditor-General must be adopted by a two-
thirds majority of its members;120 while a resolution calling for the removal of a member of a 
Chapter Nine Commission must be adopted by a majority of the members of the 
Assembly.121Finally, section 194(3) goes on to provide that the President must remove a person 
from office if the National Assembly has adopted a resolution calling for the person’s 
removal.122 In addition, the President may also suspend a person from office at any time after the 
start of proceedings of a committee of the National Assembly for the removal of that person.123 
 
The requirements for the removal from office of Chapter Nine office holders indicates how the 
Constitution seeks to guarantee the independence of Chapter Nine Institutions. This is because 
the phrase “may be removed” shows how the Constitution, in this instance, does not make use of 
the same emphatic language as is used in respect of the appointment of Chapter Nine office 
holders. It can be argued that this was a deliberate oversight aimed at ensuring the security of 
tenure of these institutions. As this is not a peremptory or mandatory constitutional provision, it 
thus takes away the possible temptation to invoke this section to insist upon the removal of 
Chapter Nine office holders and commissioners at whim which would in turn impede the 
effective discharge of their respective constitutional mandates.124 
 
The Constitution further stipulates that the President may suspend a person from office at any 
time after the start of the proceedings of a committee of the National Assembly for the removal 
of that person; and must remove a person from office upon adoption by the National Assembly 
                                                          
120 Section 194(2)(a). 
121 Section 194(2)(b). 
122 Section 194(3)(b). 
123 Section 194(3)(a). 
124 Had the phrase “must be removed” been used instead, politicians or public functionaries would thus have had a 
desperate straw to clutch at in attempting to exert their clout or influence to secure the removal of a non-partisan 
office bearer via the courts. 
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of a resolution to that effect.125 Use of the word “may” here again shows that the President has 
no general authority to suspend a Chapter Nine office bearer from office, which serves to 
reinforce section 181(4) of the Constitution which affirms that “[n]o person or organ of state 
may interfere with the functioning of these institutions” (emphasis added). The cumulative 
implication of these constitutional provisions therefore is that Chapter Nine Institutions are 
intended to be independent and impartial institutions – not only outside government, but also 
outside partisan politics, and therefore from interference from other organs of state, presumably 
so as to depoliticize the issues with which they deal.126 
 
3.4 The constitutional powers and functions of the Public Protector 
 
As pointed out above, the investigatory and remedial powers of the Public Protector are set out in 
section 182(1) of the Constitution which provides that: 
 
The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation: 
(a)  to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of 
government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice;  
(b)  to report on that conduct; and 
(c)  to take appropriate remedial action.127 
 
Section 182(2) of the Constitution provides further that these powers may be supplemented by 
national legislation. Apart from conferring powers upon the Public Protector, the Constitution 
also imposes an important limit. Section 182(3) provides in this respect that the Public Protector 
may not investigate court decisions. The national legislation envisaged in section 181(2) of the 
Constitution, is the Public Protector Act,128 which was extensively amended in 1998 in order to 
bring it in line with the Constitution. 
 
4. The statutory framework 
                                                          
125 Section 194(3)(a).  
126 C Murray “The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions” 6(2) 
PELJ (2006) 127.  
127 Section 182(1) (a), (b) and (c). 
128 23 of 1994. 
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The primary source of the Public Protector’s investigatory and remedial powers is the 
Constitution. Statutory framework further confers a wide range of additional and supplementary 
powers on her Office. 
 




According to its long title, the purpose of the Public Protector Act is to “provide for matters 
incidental to the Office of the Public Protector as contemplated in the Constitution …, and to 
provide for matters connected therewith”. The Act itself is divided into seventeen sections. These 
deal, inter alia, with the establishment, appointment, remuneration and conditions of 
employment of the Public Protector and Deputy Public Protector;129 the staff, finances and 
liabilities of the Public Protector;130 and the powers, functions and remedies of the Public 
Protector.131 For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to deal only with the sections that deal 
with the powers, functions and remedies of the Public Protector. 
 
(ii) The powers, functions and remedies of the Public Protector 
 
Insofar as the powers and functions of the Public Protector are concerned, the most significant 
section of the Public Protector Act is section 6, which deals with two issues: first, the manner in 
which complaints can be lodged with the Office of the Public Protector; and, second, the 
additional powers of the Public Protector. The sub-sections dealing with the additional powers of 
the Public Protector also make provision for additional remedies. 
 
                                                          
129 Section 1A, section 2 and section 2A. 
130 Section 3, section 4 and section 5. 
131 Section 6, section 7, section 7A and second 8. 
33 
 
The additional powers of the Public Protector are set out in section 6(4)(a) of the Public Protector 
Act. This section provides that the Public Protector has the power to investigate, on his or her 
own initiative132 or on receipt of a complaint, any alleged: 
 
(i)  maladministration in connection with the affairs of government at any level; 
(ii)  abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, discourteous or other improper 
conduct or undue delay by a person performing a public function; 
(iii)  improper or dishonest act, or omission or offences referred to in Chapter 2 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, with respect to public money; 
(iv)  improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper advantage, or promise of such 
enrichment or advantage, by a person as a result of an act or omission in the public administration or 
in connection with the affairs of government at any level or of a person performing a public 
function; or 
(v)  act or omission by a person in the employ of government at any level, or a person performing a 
public function, which results in unlawful or improper prejudice to any other person. 
 
Apart from the additional powers listed above, section 6(5) of the Public Protector Act also 
provides that the Public Protector has the power to investigate the same allegations (except those 
listed in paragraph (c)) when they have been levelled, not against the government at any level or 
a person performing a public function, but rather against any institution in which the state is the 
majority or controlling shareholder or of any public entity defined in section 1 of the Public 
Finance Act.133 
 
Besides setting out the additional powers of the Public Protector, section 6(4) of the Public 
Protector Act also provides for additional remedies by imposing a duty on the Public Protector to 
try and resolve any dispute or rectify any act of omission by:  
 
(a)  conciliation, mediation and negotiation;  
(b)  advising the complainant of appropriate remedies; or  
                                                          
132 Unlike the Auditor-General, the Public Protector may investigate a matter on his or her own initiative. He or she 
does not have to wait for a member of the public to lodge a complaint with him or her (see Public Protector v Mail 
and Guardian Ltd 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at para 9). 
133 1 of 1999. Section 6(7) of the Public Protector Act confers the power on the Public Protector to investigate 
attempts to commit the types of misconduct listed in section 6(4) and 6(5). 
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(c)  using any other means that may be effective.134 
 
Finally, it must be noted that even if a complaint made to the Public Protector falls within her 
jurisdiction, she may refuse to investigate the complaint in certain circumstances. Section 6(3) 
provides in this respect that: 
 
The Public Protector may refuse to investigate a matter reported to him or her, if the person ostensibly 
prejudiced in the matter is: 
(a)  an officer or employee in the service of the state or is a person to whom the provisions of the Public 
Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994), are applicable and has, in connection with such 
matter, not taken all reasonable steps to exhaust the remedies conferred upon him or her in terms of 
the said Public Service Act, 1994; or 
(b)  prejudiced by conduct referred to in subsections (4) and (5) and has not taken all reasonable steps to 
exhaust his or her legal remedies in connection with such matter. 
 
As the Supreme Court of Appeal indicated in its judgment in Public Protector v Mail and 
Guardian Ltd, unlike the Advocate-General, the Public Protector’s powers are not only wide, but 
are also intended to be proactive. In this regard, in order to trigger an investigation, the Public 
Protector does not have to wait for matters to be referred to him or her; instead, he or she can 
initiate investigative proceedings. In some instances, this can be done on no more than on the 
mere basis of information that has come to his or her own knowledge.135 The powers of the 
Public Protector thus require more than the passive adjudication of disputes between individuals 
and the government.136 
 
It is for this reason that the means through which the Public Protector can obtain information and 
conduct investigations is considerably more flexible than those available to the courts. As a 
starting point section 6(1) provides that “[a]ny matter in respect of which the Public Protector 
has jurisdiction may be reported to the Public Protector by any person – (a) by means of a written 
or oral declaration under oath or after having made an affirmation … or, (b) by such other means 
                                                          
134 Section 6(4)(b). 
135 Section 7(1)(a).  
136 Corruption Watch Importance of the Public Protector Available at:  http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Bua-Mzansi-Importance-of-the-Public-Protector.pdf (Accessed: 8 August 2016).  
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as the Public Protector may allow …”137 (emphasis added). The use of wide terms such as “by 
any person” indicates that there is no circumscription of the persons from whom, and the bodies 
from which, information may be sought by the Public Protector in the course of an 
investigation.138 The phrase “by such other means” also indicates how the Public Protector is 
conferred with wide-sweeping powers of obtaining information.139  
 
The Public Protector Act goes on to prescribe additional discretionary powers of investigation on 
the Public Protector. In that regard, the Public Protector may request any person at any level of 
government, performing a public function or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Public 
Protector to render him or her with assistance with regard to a particular investigation or 
investigations in general.140 Specifically, he or she may, by way of a subpoena, call for the 
production of documents by any person;141 may request an explanation from any person;142 may 
require any person appearing as a witness to give evidence on oath or after having made an 
affirmation;143 and he or she (or any person so delegated) may administer an oath to or accept an 
affirmation from any such person.144 
 
In addition, the Public Protector can, upon the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate or judge, 
conduct a search of any building or premises for the purposes of making such investigation or 
inquiry that he or she may deem necessary and may there and then proceed to seize anything on 
those premises which, in his or her opinion, has a bearing on the investigation.145 It is clear then 
that the Public Protector is not to be inhibited, undermined or sabotaged in the exercise of his or 
her investigative powers.146 Notably, however, the proactive nature of the Public Protector’s 
powers of investigation does not accord an unfettered discretion in this respect as such powers 
                                                          
137 Section 6(1)(a) and (b).  
138 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 11.  
139 In addition, the format and procedure to be followed in conducting any investigation, including preliminary 
investigations, is left to the Public Protector to determine. The Public Protector can also direct that any persons, 
whose presence is undesirable, should not be present during any proceedings that form part of an investigation (see 
sections 7(1)(b) (i) and (ii)).  
140 Section 7(3)(a).  
141 Sections 7(4)(a) and 7(5). 
142 Section 7(4)(b).  
143 Section 7(6). 
144 Section 7(7).  
145 Section 7A(1) and (2).  
146 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) at para 54.  
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have to be exercised within the framework of the Public Protector’s jurisdiction as found within 
the Constitution and the law.147  
 
4.2 Additional legislation regulating the Public Protector’s powers  
 
(i) Introduction  
 
Besides the Constitution and the Public Protector Act, further powers are conferred upon the 
Public Protector by a number of other statutes. These include the Executive Members Ethics 
Act,148 Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act,149 the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act,150 the Protected Disclosures Act,151 and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act.152  
 
As Malunga notes, an important consequence of the proliferation of statutes conferring powers 
on the Public Protector is that the Office has become a multiple mandate agency with various key 
mandate areas.153 These different mandates shall now be discussed in turn. 
 
(ii) The Executive Members Ethics Act 
 
According to its long title, the purpose of the Executive Members Ethics Act (the “EME Act”) is 
to “provide for a code of ethics governing the conduct of members of the Cabinet, Deputy 
Ministers and members of the provincial Executive Councils and to provide for matters 
connected therewith”.154  
                                                          
147 Corruption Watch Importance of the Public Protector Available at:  http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Bua-Mzansi-Importance-of-the-Public-Protector.pdf (Accessed: 8 August 2016). 
148 82 of 1998. 
149 95 of 1998. 
150 2 of 2000. 
151 26 of 2000. 
152 12 of 2004 
153 K Malunga “Twenty years of South African constitutionalism: An assessment of the role and challenges of the 
Office of the Public Protector asserting South Africa’s transformative constitutionalism”  New York School Law 
Review (2014) 3. 
154 In order to achieve its purpose, section 2 of the EME Act imposes an obligation on the President, after consulting 
with Parliament, to publish a code of ethics prescribing standards and rules aimed at promoting open, democratic 
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The Public Protector is accorded exclusive jurisdiction to investigate any alleged breach of the 
Code of Ethics under section 3(1) of the EME Act. However, the Public Protector can only 
conduct an investigation where a complaint has been lodged to this effect. Section 4(1) provides 
in this respect that the Public Protector may only investigate: 
 
(a)  a complaint against a Cabinet member, a Premier or Deputy Minister, if it has been submitted by the 
President, a member of the National Assembly or a permanent delegate to the National Council of 
Provinces;155 and 
(b)  a complaint against an MEC of a province, if it has been submitted by the Premier or a member of 
the provincial legislature of the province.156 
 
The Public Protector has at least 30 days to conduct an investigation on the complaint he or she 
has received and must submit a report on the alleged breach of conduct within that period.157 If 
the complaint is against a Cabinet member, a Premier or a Deputy Minister, the Public Protector 
must submit the report to the President. If the complaint is against an MEC, the Public Protector 
must submit the report to the Premier of the province concerned.158 
 
After the President or the Premier has received the report, he or she must, within 14 days, submit 
the copy of the report and any comments on it together with any report on any action that will be 
taken against it to the National Assembly (in the case of a complaint against a Cabinet member 
or Deputy Minister),159 the National Council of Provinces (in the case of a complaint against a 
Premier),160 or the Provincial Legislature (in the case of a complaint against an MEC).161 When 
investigating any complaint in terms of the EME Act, the Public Protector has the same powers 
that are vested in him or her in terms of the Public Protector Act.162  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and accountable government and with which Cabinet members, Deputy Ministers and MECs must comply in 
performing their official responsibilities. 
155 Section 4(1)(a). 
156 Section 4(1)(b). Section 4(2) provides that the complaint must be in writing and must contain: (a) the name and 
address of the complainant; (b) the full particulars of the alleged conduct of the Cabinet member, Deputy Minister or 
MEC; and (c) such other information as may be required by the Public Protector or prescribed in the code of ethics. 
157 Section 3(2).  
158 Section 3(2).  
159 Section 3(5)(a). 
160 Section 3(5)(b). 
161 Section 3(6). 
162 Section 3(4).  
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(iii) The Promotion of Access to Information Act  
 
According to its long title, the purpose of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (the 
“PAIA Act”) is to “give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the 
State … and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights”. Section 91 of the PAIA 
amended section 6 of the Public Protector Act. This section now provides that the Public 
Protector may investigate an act or failure to act in terms of the PAIA, if a person lodges a 
complaint in this respect with the Office of the Public Protector.163 
 
(iv) The Protected Disclosures Act 
 
According to its long title, the purpose of the Protected Disclosures Act (the “PD Act”) is to 
establish “provisions for employees to report unlawful or irregular conduct by employers and 
fellow employees, while at the same time providing protection for employees who blow the 
whistle”.  
 
Section  8(1)(a) of the PD Act mandates the Public Protector with the protection of the 
confidentiality of information disclosed by an employee regarding any impropriety (by their 
employer or other employees in the employ of their employer) which falls within the description 
of matters ordinarily dealt with by the Public Protector. In addition, section 8(2) of the PD Act 
provides that the Public Protector must also render necessary assistance to the employee where 
he or she is of the view that the matter would be more appropriately dealt with by another person 
or body tasked with protecting information under the PD Act.  
 
(v) The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
 
According to its long title, the purpose of the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities 
Act (the “Corruption Act”) is to inter alia, “provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent 
and combat corruption and corrupt activities”. Under section 6(4) of the Public Protector Act, the 
Public Protector has the competency to investigate, on his or her own initiative, or on receipt of a 
                                                          
163 See also section 6(4)(d) of the Public Protector Act.  
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complaint:  improper or dishonest acts, or omissions or offences in so far as they relate to the 
offences referred to in Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 
2004, with respect to public money. 
 
(vi) The Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act 
 
According to its long title, the purpose of the Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act (the 
“Housing Protection Act”) is “To make provision for the protection of housing consumers; and 
to provide for the establishment and functions of the National Home Builders Registration 
Council; and to provide for matters connected therewith”. Section 22(4) of the Housing 
Protection Act provides that a housing consumer or a home builder may refer a decision to the 
Public Protector for review in terms of the Public Protector Act.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
What emerges from the above discussion is that the Legislature took the regulation of the 
powers, duties and functions of the Public Protector very seriously. Not only can a case be made 
for the Public Protector Act as an extensive statutory instrument that sets out various procedural 
and administrative guidelines regarding, inter alia, the appointment, remuneration and 
investigative procedures concerning the office of the Public Protector;164 but, and more 
importantly, additional legislation that has served to expand the Public Protector’s mandate areas 
is not only indicative of the pliability of the institution but of its increased relevance in 
guaranteeing that the promotion of accountability; an essential component of sustainable 




                                                          
164 AS Yakoob “Ambiguity surrounding the powers of the public protector – a threat to the rule of law” (2015) 
Available at: http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/10/ZP_Files/salrc-essay-aadelah-shaik-yakoob.zp95040.pdf 
(Accessed: 14 June 2016).  
40 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Prior to the appointment of Advocate Thuli Madonsela as the Public Protector in 2009,165 the 
manner in which the Office of the Public Protector exercised its investigatory and remedial 
powers was taken on review on only one significant occasion and culminated in the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Public Protector of the RSA v Mail and Guardian Ltd.166 In this 
judgment the Supreme Court of Appeal (per Nugent JA; Ponnan, Snyders and Tshiqui JJA and 
Plasket AJA concurring) reviewed and set aside the Public Protector’s report into the 
misappropriation of public funds by PetroSA on the grounds that his “investigation was so scant 
as to not have been an investigation at all”.167  
 
In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that “although the functions of the 
Public Protector include those that are usually associated with an ombudsman, they go far 
beyond that” seeing as “[T]he Public Protector is not a passive adjudicator between citizens and 
the state, relying upon evidence that is placed before him or her before acting. His or her 
mandate is an investigatory one, requiring pro-action in appropriate circumstances”.168 In 
addition, the Court held further, the Public Protector must carry out his investigatory tasks with 
an “open and enquiring mind” and, further that: “investigation that is not conducted with an open 
and enquiring mind is no investigation at all”.169  
 
Following the appointment of Advocate Madonsela (and subsequently the appointment of 
Advocate Mkhwebane), the number of review applications increased significantly. Apart from 
                                                          
165 The first person appointed to the Office of the Public Protector was Advocate Selby Baqwa in 1995. After his 
seven year term ended in 2002, he was replaced by Advocate Lawrence Mushwana. When Advocate Mushwana 
seven year term ended in 2009, he was replaced by Advocate Thuli Madonsela. When Advocate Madonsela’s seven 
year term ended in 2016, she was replaced by Advocate Busiswe Mkhwebane. Advocate Mkhwebane is the current 
Public Protector, 
166 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA). 
167 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at para 141.  
168 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at para 9. 
169 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at para 21. 
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the investigation into the appointment of Mr Motsoneng by the SABC,170 the investigations into 
the installation of security measures at Nkandla,171 the failure by the Reserve Bank to recover 
misappropriated funds172 and the conduct of certain employees of the Department of Home 
Affairs were also taken on review.173 
 
As Calland and Pienaar point out, this increase may be traced back to a number of different 
factors. Among these is that Advocate Madonsela herself displayed a strong sense of 
independence and adopted a rigorous approach towards her powers. At the same time, 
pathologies associated with a dominant party democracy and especially the problem of 
corruption manifested themselves more strongly. In order to address the pathologies the 
Constitutional Court also sought to strengthen the authority of independent institutions such as 
the Public Protector.174 
 
Unlike the litigation in Public Protector of the RSA v Mail and Guardian Ltd, the review 
applications referred to above did not focus on the manner in which the Public Protector should 
carry out an investigation, but rather the manner in which she should exercise her powers and 
                                                          
170 See Public Protector When Governance and Ethics Fail: Report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration, systemic governance deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi 
Motsoeneng by the South African Broadcasting Corporation Report No. 23 of 2013/2014. The remedial action taken 
in this investigation was reviewed initially by the Western Cape High Court in Democratic Alliance v South African 
Broadcasting Corporation 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) and subsequently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in South 
African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA). 
171 See Public Protector Secure in Comfort: Report on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical 
conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at 
and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal province Report 
No. 25 of 2013/14. The legal nature of the Public Protector’s remedial action had initially been reviewed by the 
Western Cape High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal  and was subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC).  
172 See Public Protector Alleged failure to recover misappropriated funds: report on an investigation into allegations 
of maladministration, corruption, misappropriation of public funds and failure by the South African Government to 
implement the CIEX report and to recover public funds from Absa Bank Report No. 8 of 2017/2018. The remedial 
action taken in this investigation was reviewed by the Gauteng North High Court in South African Reserve Bank v 
Public Protector of South Africa 2017 (6) SA 198 (GP) and ABSA Bank Ltd v Public Protector of South Africa 
[2018] 2 All SA 1 (GP). 
173 See Public Protector Unjust Forfeiture: Report on an investigation into an alleged unfair labour practice by the 
Department of Home Affairs Report No. 7 of 2013/14.The remedial action in this investigation was reviewed 
initially by the Gauteng North High Court in Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of South Africa 2017 (2) 
SA 597 (GP) and subsequently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of 
South Africa 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA). 
174 R Calland and G Pienaar “Guarding the guardians: South Africa’s Chapter Nine Institutions” in D Plaatjies et al 
(eds) State of the Nation (2016) 65 67. 
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especially on the legal nature of her remedial power. The most significant judgments in this 
respect, however, are the following: 
 
First, the judgment of the Western Cape High Court in Democratic Alliance v South African 
Broadcasting Corporation. In this case the Court held that remedial action taken by the Public 
Protector is not legally binding, but that any decision not to comply was reviewable on the 
grounds of rationality. Given that this approach requires the Public Protector to convince the 
relevant organ of state to comply with its remedial action by force of reasoning, it may be 
referred to as the co-operative approach.175  
 
Second, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in South African Broadcasting 
Corporation v Democratic Alliance and the Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters 
v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly. In 
these cases both courts essentially held that remedial action taken by the Public Protector is 
legally binding. Given that this approach does not require the Public Protector to convince the 
relevant organ of state by force of reasoning, but rather gives the Public Protector the authority to 
compel that organ of state to comply, this approach may be referred to as the conflictual 
approach.176 
 
Third, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Home Affairs v Public 
Protector of South Africa. In this case the Supreme Court of Appeal held that legally binding 
remedial action taken by the Public Protector can be reviewed, but only on the grounds that it 
infringes the principle of legality and not on the grounds that it infringes the constitutional right 
to just administrative action177 or the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.178 This may be 
referred to as the legality approach.179 Each of these respective approaches will be discussed in 
the section that follows. 
 
                                                          
175 Emphasis added. 
176 Emphasis added. 
177 The right to just administrative action is guaranteed in section 33 of the Constitution which provides, inter alia, 
that “[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”. 
178 3 of 2000. 
179 Emphasis added. 
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As pointed out above, the co-operative approach was adopted by the Western Cape High Court 
in its judgment in Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation. The 
substance and consequence of this judgment is elaborated upon hereunder. 
 
2.2 Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation180 
 
(i) The facts 
 
The facts, as stated here, appear from the case and from the Public Protector’s report. Between 
November 2011 and February 2012 three former employees of the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (the “SABC”) lodged complaints with the Office of the Public Protector in which 
they alleged that the Acting Chief Operation Officer (“COO”) of the SABC, Mr Hlaudi 
Motsoeneng, had been irregularly appointed.181 In addition, they also alleged that there had been 
maladministration at the SABC relating to human resources, financial mismanagement and 
governance failures and that the Minister of Communication had improperly interfered in the 
affairs of the SABC. 
 
Following a detailed investigation into these complaints, the Public Protector issued a report in 
which she found that the complaints were valid and took remedial action against the Minister and 
the Board of the SABC. 182 In her remedial action, the Public Protector directed the Minister and 
the Board to take a number of steps. Among these were the following: 
• First, the Board had to ensure that the long-standing vacant position of COO was filled 
with a person who possessed the requisite qualifications. 
                                                          
180 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC). 
181 T Madonsela When Governance and Ethics Fail: A Report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration, systemic governance deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi 




• Second, the Board had to ensure that all monies that were irregularly and unlawfully 
spent were recovered from the relevant persons.  
• Third, the Board had to ensure that disciplinary proceedings were taken against Mr 
Motsoeneng for his dishonesty relating to the misrepresentation of his qualifications, 
abuse of power, improper conduct in the irregular appointments and salary increases of 
employees and for himself as well as for the purging of staff.183 
 
Instead of implementing the Public Protector’s remedial action, however, the Board appointed 
Mr Motsoeneng as the permanent COO and the Minister approved this appointment.184 In 
addition, the Board appointed a firm of attorneys to investigate the veracity and findings of the 
Public Protector and to assist the Board and the management of the SABC to respond to the 
Public Protector’s report.185 The decision to appoint Mr Motsoeneng as the permanent COO was 
based partly on the fact that this firm of attorneys absolved Mr Motsoeneng of any wrongdoing. 
 
After the Minister approved the appointment of Mr Motsoeneng as the permanent COO, the 
Democratic Alliance (the “DA”) applied to the Western Cape High Court for an order, inter alia, 
immediately suspending Mr Motsoeneng from his position as COO; instructing the Board to 
institute disciplinary action against him; instructing the Board to appoint a suitably qualified 
person as the acting COO pending the appointment of a suitably qualified permanent COO; and 
reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Board to appoint Mr Motsoeneng as the 
permanent COO as well as the Minister’s decision to approve his appointment.186 
 
(ii) The legal question 
 
The key legal question that the Western Cape High Court had to deal with in this application was 
whether the Public Protector’s remedial action is legally binding and enforceable.187 
 
(iii) The reasoning of the court 
                                                          
183 Ibid. 
184 Id at para 13. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 




The High Court (per Schippers J) found in favour of the DA and granted the orders it had applied 
for. In arriving at this decision, the High Court began its analysis by stating that in her 
submissions the Public Protector argued that, properly interpreted, sections 182(1)(c) of the 
Constitution188 and section 6(4)(b) of the Public Protector Act189 provided that remedial action 
taken by the Public Protector was legally binding and enforceable unless successfully challenged 
on review and that any other interpretation would render the Public Protector toothless.190  
 
This argument, the High Court stated, is not correct. Its reasoning was that: “[U]nlike the courts, 
the Public Protector does not hear and determine causes as this is because her powers and 
functions are primarily investigative and not adjudicative”.191 In addition: “[u]nlike a court order, 
her findings are not binding on persons or organs of state, as such, if the drafters of the 
Constitution intended the findings of the Public Protector to be binding and enforceable, then the 
Constitution would have explicitly said so.”192 Instead, the power to take remedial action in 
section 182(1)(c) is linked to the power to investigate corruption and maladministration in 
section 182(1)(a).193 
 
It was also important to note, the High Court then stated, that in the First Certification Judgment 
the Constitutional Court held that the Office of the Public Protector was modelled on the 
institution of the ombudsman, which, according to the court, was significant for two reasons. 
First, like the Public Protector, the ombudsman is normally independent from the other branches 
of government and subject only to the law.194 Second, in contrast to its investigatory powers, the 
ombudsman does not ordinarily possess legally binding and enforceable remedial powers.195 This 
                                                          
188 Section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national 
legislation, to take appropriate remedial action”. 
189 Section 6(4)(b) of the Public Protector Act provides that the Public Protector is competent, inter alia, to 
“endeavor in his or her sole discretion, to resolve any dispute or rectify any act or omission by: (i) mediation, 
conciliation or negotiation; (ii) advising, when necessary, any complainant regarding appropriate remedies; or (iii) 
any other means that may be expedient in the circumstances”. 
190 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 49. 
191 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 50. 
192 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 51. 
193 Ibid.  
194 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 55. 
195 Ibid.  
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is because the ombudsman is usually required to rely on the logical force of its findings and the 
power of persuasion – these same principles were said to apply to the Public Protector.196  
 
The fact that remedial action taken by the Public Protector is not legally binding and enforceable, 
however, the High Court stated further, does not mean that her findings and remedial actions are 
mere recommendations, which the implicated organ of state may accept or reject.197 Before it 
may reject the findings and the remedial action taken by the Public Protector, the implicated 
organ of state must have “cogent reasons for doing so, that is, for reasons other than a mere 
preference for its own view”.198  
 
A similar approach, the High Court stated, was adopted by the English Court of Appeal in R (on 
the application of Bradley & others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.199 In this case, 
the Court of Appeal held that the test for determining whether the Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions was entitled to reject the findings and recommendations made by the ombudsman 
(as he had done) was not “whether the Secretary himself considered that there was 
maladministration, but whether in the circumstances his rejection of the ombudsman’s findings 
was itself rational”.200  
 
Given that a decision whether or not to accept the findings or the remedial action taken by the 
Public Protector can be classified as an exercise of public power, the High Court stated further, 
that it follows that such a decision must comply with the principle of legality, in general, and 
with the requirement of rationality, which is a minimum threshold applicable to the exercise of 
all public power, in particular. This means that a decision to reject the Public Protector’s findings 
or remedial action must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given.201 
 
When the Public Protector makes a finding or takes remedial action, the High Court concluded, 
the steps that must be taken by the implicated organ of state are as follows: 
                                                          
196 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 57. 
197 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 59. 
198 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 66. 
199 [2008] 3 All ER 1116 (CA).  
200 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 67. 




(a)  The organ of state must properly consider the findings and remedial action.  As the findings are not 
binding and enforceable, the organ of state must decide whether or not the findings should be 
accepted and the remedial action implemented.  That is the purpose of the power.  
 
(b)  The process by which that decision is made and the decision itself, must be rational, having regard to 
the underlying purpose of the Public Protector – to ensure that government officials carry out their 
tasks effectively, fairly and without corruption or prejudice. 
 
(c)  In a case where a dispute arises because the organ of state decides not to accept the findings or 
implement the remedial action, it obviously has to engage the Public Protector. Contrary to the 
contention by counsel for the first to third respondents, such engagement, in my view, does not take 
place pursuant to the provisions of s 41 of the Constitution – the Public Protector is not an organ of 
state within a sphere of government as contemplated in s 41(1). (It is thus hardly surprising that the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 does not apply to the Public Protector.) 
 
(d)  Ultimately the relevant organ of state may apply for judicial review of the Public Protector’s 
investigation and report.  
 
Essentially therefore, the court’s position here was that it is not really necessary for the Public 
Protector’s remedial action to be binding for this institution to effectively discharge its 
constitutional mandate. As a result, “the plain wording and context of section 182(1)” in this 
instance was interpreted to mean that the power to take appropriate remedial action means no 
more than that: “[t]he Public Protector may take steps to redress improper or prejudicial conduct, 
and not that the findings of the Public Protector are binding and enforceable”.202 
 
In application of these principles to the facts, the Court was able to determine that the exercise of 
public power in the permanent appointment of Motsoeneng by Minister of Communications, Ms 
Muthambi, could not be said to be rationally related to the purpose for which that power was 
given; (namely, to ensure the operational efficacy of the SABC by filling the long-vacant post 
with a permanent appointee),203 given that the person so appointed lacked the requisite 
                                                          
202 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC)  at para 58. 
203 The respondents contended that Motsoeneng was permanently appointed to the position of COO “in the interests 
of the SABC – to achieve its stability going forward” Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Ltd and Others 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para 15.  
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qualifications necessary to effectively attain this purpose. As such, the court declared, “[t]he 
conduct of the board and the minister in rejecting the findings and remedial action of the Public 




Although the Western Cape High Court’s judgment was welcomed by academic and political 
commentators, especially those aligned with the ANC, it also gave rise to some concerns. One of 
these is that it incorrectly compared the binding and enforceable nature of the remedies taken by 
the Public Protector to orders of the courts rather than to decisions of administrative bodies. 
Another was that it wrongly compared the Office of the Public Protector to other ombudsmen 
institutions in comparable jurisdictions without investigating these institutions in any particular 
depth and without giving sufficient consideration to the experimental and unique role of the 
Public Protector as an independent institution supporting constitutional democracy. Both of these 
criticisms were referred to with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal in its subsequent 
judgment and which is discussed below.  
 




As pointed out above, the conflictual approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
its judgment in South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance. It was 
subsequently adopted by the Constitutional Court in its judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters 
v Speaker of the National Assembly. These judgments are discussed below. 
 
3.2 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance205 
 
(i) The facts 
                                                          
204 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para  83. 




After the Western Cape High Court set aside the Minister and the Board’s decision to appoint Mr 
Motsoeneng as the permanent COO and, thus, effectively ignored the Public Protector’s findings 
and remedial action on the grounds that they were irrational, the Minister and the Board appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
(ii) The legal question 
 
As was the case in the Western Cape High Court, the key legal question that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal had to deal with was whether the Public Protector’s remedial action is legally binding 
and enforceable.206 
 
(iii) The reasoning of the court 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (per Navsa and Ponnan JJA; Mpati P, Swain and Dambuza JJA 
concurring) dismissed the appeal and found in favour of the DA. In arriving at this decision, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal began its analysis by setting out and examining both the history and 
the purpose underlying the Office of the Public Protector and the constitutional and statutory 
framework governing her investigatory and remedial powers.207 This examination, the Court 
stated, clearly showed that the powers conferred upon the Public Protector by the constitutional 
and statutory framework are not only very wide, but also “far exceed those of similar institutions 
in comparable jurisdictions”.208 
 
Given, the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised, that corruption threatens both the principles 
upon which the Constitution is based, and especially the principle that government must be 
accountable responsive and open, as well as the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, given 
further, that the Constitution itself imposes an obligation on the state to combat corruption 
through the use of efficient anti-corruption mechanisms, it is not surprising that the powers 
conferred on the Public Protector by section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution and section 6(4)(b) of 
                                                          
206 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 3. 
207 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at paras 23-32. 
208 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 43. 
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the Public Protector Act go far beyond those which are conferred on ombudsmen in other 
countries.209 
 
In its judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal then stated that the High Court had relied heavily 
on two considerations. First, the High Court appeared to have compared the powers of the Public 
Protector with those of a court and, second, it relied on the judgment of the English Court of 
Appeal in R (on the application of Bradley & others) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions.210  
 
The first consideration was wrong because the Public Protector cannot accurately be compared 
with a court. In addition, it was confusing for the High Court to state that the Public Protector’s 
powers and remedial actions are not legally “binding and enforceable”.211 This is because it is 
well-established in South African law that, until it is set aside on review, a decision taken by an 
administrative body exists in fact and has legal consequences that cannot be overlooked.212 
Irrespective of whether the Public Protector was an administrative body or not, there was no 
doubt that the same principle applied to her findings and remedial action given the unique 
position she occupies in our constitutional order.213 
 
The second consideration was wrong because the judgment dealt with the powers of an entirely 
different institution with different powers, namely the Parliamentary Commissioner established 
in terms of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967.214 Unlike the Public Protector, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner does not have any remedial powers; instead, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act merely requires her to report on her investigation to the Member of 
Parliament who laid the complaint, to the implicated Department of State and, if any injustice 
was done, to the Houses of Parliament. The powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner, 
                                                          
209 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 44. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 45. 
213 Ibid. 
214  2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 46.  
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therefore, were confined to simply reporting and did not include the power to take remedial 
action.215 
 
Apart from the fact that the considerations that the High Court relied on where wrong, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated further, it was important to note that the Public Protector would 
not be able to realize the constitutional purpose of her office if implicated organs of state could 
simply second-guess her findings and ignore her recommendations.216 Section 182(1)(c), 
therefore, must be taken to mean what it says, that is: “[T]he Public Protector may take remedial 
action herself. She may determine the remedy and direct its implementation”.217 The language, 
history and purpose of section 182(1)(c) make it clear that the Public Protector has the power to 
provide an effective remedy for state misconduct.218 
 
However, the confusion went beyond the effect of her remedial powers. A core issue that also 
fell to be determined was whether impugned conduct found by the Public Protector to be 
improper could simultaneously be declared by another institution to be proper. In a move geared 
to ensure the dignity and effectiveness of this institution, the court declared that:  
 
[a]n individual or body affected by any finding, decision or remedial action taken by the Public Protector is 
not entitled to embark on a parallel investigation process to that of the Public Protector, and adopt the 
position that the outcome of that parallel process trumps the findings, decision or remedial action taken by 
the Public Protector.219 
 
Thus, whilst it may have been permissible for the SABC to have appointed a firm of attorneys to 
assist it with the implementation of the Public Protector’s findings and remedial measures, it was 
quite impermissible for it to have established a parallel process to that already undertaken by the 
Public Protector and to thereafter assert privilege in respect thereof.220 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal then summed up its findings in the following terms: 
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216 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 52. 
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To sum up, the office of the Public Protector, like all Chapter Nine institutions, is a venerable one. Our 
constitutional compact demands that remedial action taken by the Public Protector should not be ignored. 
State institutions are obliged to heed the principles of co-operative governance as prescribed by s 41 of the 
Constitution. Any affected person or institution aggrieved by a finding, decision or action taken by the 
Public Protector might, in appropriate circumstances, challenge that by way of a review application. Absent 
a review application, however, such person is not entitled to simply ignore the findings, decision or 
remedial action taken by the Public Protector … A mere power of recommendation of the kind suggested 
by the High Court appears to be more consistent with the language of the Interim Constitution and is 
neither fitting nor effective, denudes the office of the Public Protector of any meaningful content, and 
defeats its purpose. The effect of the High Court’s judgment is that, if the organ of State or State official 
concerned simply ignores the Public Protector’s remedial measures, it would fall to a private litigant or the 
Public Protector herself to institute court proceedings to vindicate her office. Before us, all the parties were 
agreed that a useful metaphor for the Public Protector was that of a watchdog. As is evident from what is 
set out above, this watchdog should not be muzzled.221 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal then turned to apply these principles to the facts of the case. After 
doing so it also came to the conclusion that the Board and the Minister had implicitly rejected the 
Public Protector’s findings and remedial action when Mr Motsoeneng was appointed as the 
COO.222 Given that the Public Protector’s findings and remedies were legally binding and 
enforceable, they were not entitled to do so. As such, the court declared their decisions to be 




In asserting that the Public Protector is an entity aimed at guarding the guards; that it should not 
be muzzled; that a parallel process cannot be undertaken and given precedence over that already 
initiated by the Public Protector; that the Public Protector’s remedial action, once stipulated, 
cannot be ignored and significantly that the Public Protector constitutes an important defense 
against maladministration and corruption, the Supreme Court of Appeal seemed to be taking the 
view that a conflictual approach, where the Public Protector can compel organs of state to 
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comply with his or her directives is preferable in terms of getting senior public functionaries to 
be accountable to the public for decisions made and actions taken.224The conflictual approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in this instance was confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court soon thereafter in its judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly. 
 
3.3 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 
 
(i) The facts 
 
(a) The background 
 
Litigation culminating in the EFF judgment arose out of allegations of impropriety and unethical 
conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security and related features at 
President Jacob Zuma’s private Nkandla residence in KwaZulu-Natal.225 The first storm clouds 
started brewing with the Mail and Guardian’s 2009 publication of an article titled: “Zuma’s 
R65m Nkandla splurge”. In it, the Mail and Guardian alleged that the president was renovating 
his remote homestead at a staggering cost of R65 million and that the taxpayer was footing the 
largest chunk of this bill.226 Of major concern was the justifiability of such extreme opulence 
being displayed amidst the impoverished Nkandla community in particular (made up of 13 000 
people, many of whom had no access to electricity and for whom in-house water was a rarity) 
and in the face of a state that was struggling to meet the needs of its people in general.227 
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Concern was also expressed as to how future presidents would benefit from this development 
given that state money was being used in the renovation of a personal homestead.228 
 
In a subsequent newspaper article titled: “Bunker bunker time: Zuma’s lavish Nkandla upgrade” 
published on the 11th of November 2011, the Mail and Guardian went on to allege that there 
were now new additions to the initial project that had commenced in 2009.229 Such additions 
were said to include three sets of underground living quarters with about 10 air-conditioned 
rooms.230Additional facilities were said to include a clinic for the President and his family, a 
gymnasium, underground parking, a helicopter pad, twenty houses for security guards that are 
above ground, playgrounds and a visitors’ centre.231 
 
Not surprisingly, the cost of the project, which had initially been pegged at R65 million in 2009, 
had, by the time of the publication of this article, escalated significantly. The additions to the 
ongoing renovations had brought the cost to a staggering R215 million while the Department of 
Public Works indicated that it was spending R36 million on security related construction thereby 
bringing the envisaged total cost to R246 million.232 
 
Apart from the release of a statement by the Presidency on 3 December 2009, denying that 
government was footing the bill, nothing seems to have been done by government to verify the 
2009 allegations or attempt to arrest the costs which the article predicted would continue to 
rise.233 Concerns began to mount due to the blatant excessive cost of the extensive renovations 
being conducted and also, as to where such funds were stemming from.  
 
Sometime in 2011, a complaint was lodged with the Public Protector requesting an investigation 
into the veracity of the allegations published by the Mail and Guardian.234 Between 13 December 
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2011 and November 2012, the Public Protector received a total of seven complaints lodged in 
terms of the Public Protector Act and the Executive Members’ Ethics Act relating to the 
opulence of the upgrades at Nkandla.235 The outcome of the Public Protector’s investigation into 
these allegations was subsequently released by way of a report aptly titled: “Secure in Comfort”. 
 
(b) The Public Protector’s report 
 
The report into allegations of impropriety and unethical conduct in respect of the installation and 
implementation of non-security features at the President’s private Nkandla mansion at state 
expense is arguably the most controversial report to have been released by a Public Protector to 
date. Subject to scrutiny was the conduct of Jacob Zuma; by far no ordinary individual. Rather, 
as was aptly noted by the Constitutional Court, as Head of State and of the National Executive, 
he is, ultimately, the highest calling to the highest office in the land; the image of South Africa 
and the first to be remembered at its mention on any global platform.236 
 
It is in this light that the graveness of the allegations becomes glaringly clear; not only due to the 
seriousness of the issues subject to investigation and their possible political ramifications (seeing 
as material infringements of the constitution and ethical violations were being alleged),237 but 
also due to the high public visibility of the key actors in the matter. Worth noting is how those 
who wield public power have a duty to make judicious or prudent use of the resources made 
available to them for the collective good of those on whose behalf such resources are controlled. 
According to Govender, the drafters of the Constitution correctly concluded that the state is best 
placed to effectively deliver on the promise of social upliftment which is why a direct, 
concomitant obligation was placed on the state to use its resources to meaningfully address 
poverty and inequality.238It is in this vein that the Constitution in section 195(1)(b) prescribes 
that: “[E]fficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted”. 
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The President and government should thus have been eager to more carefully manage taxpayers 
money. Instead, more than R200 million of taxpayers’ money was lavished on the private home 
of a person who – in less than six years – would again become a private citizen.239 Public funds 
that could have been utilised in the furtherance of more substantial projects240 were instead 
channelled towards the grand scheme that was the extensive refurbishment of President Jacob 
Zuma’s private Nkandla mansion.  
 
It is against these weighty considerations that the following general observations and specific 
findings were made in the report, inter alia that:  
• while authority to facilitate security upgrades at the home of the President did exist,241 
there was no evidence to indicate that the trigger mechanism for the state to get involved 
financially in covering the costs for the security measures, in respect of any law, was 
complied with242 and that even if one were to proceed from the premise that authority for 
the cost of post April 2010 renovations to the President’s homestead being borne by the 
state existed by virtue of its declaration as a National Key Point on the 8th of April 2010 
(despite renovations having commenced in 2009 before this was the case), that 
nonetheless, such authority had been exercised improperly and beyond its scope by 
officials in the Nkandla project243 seeing as; 
• additional items in the form of a swimming pool, visitors’ centre, amphitheatre, cattle 
kraal, marquee area, extensive paving and new houses for relocated relatives were 
included as security upgrades despite not having been identified as security measures in 
the list compiled by security experts in pursuit of  security evaluations.244 
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In the result, the report found that this excessive expenditure had added substantial value to the 
President’s private property at the state’s expense.245 Consequently, the President and his 
immediate family were found to have been unjustifiably enriched in perpetuity through the 
installation of non-security comforts ostensibly implemented in the name of security.246 
 
The Public Protector proceeded to prescribe the remedial action to be taken in order to soften the 
impact of the Nkandla project. The President was directed to take steps to determine, with the 
assistance of the National Treasury and the SAPS, the reasonable cost of the non-security 
measures implemented at his private Nkandla residence and to then pay a reasonable percentage 
of such costs.247 The President also had to reprimand the Ministers involved for the appalling 
manner in which the Nkandla Project was handled and state funds abused.248 
 
This report was submitted to the President and also to the National Assembly, “[p]resumably to 
facilitate compliance with the remedial action in line with its constitutional obligations to hold 
the President accountable”.249 However in a purported exercise of its oversight function, 
Parliament chose to endorse a report by the Minister of Police stemming from a parallel 
investigation to that of the Public Protector which essentially absolved the President of all 
liability as well as a report to the same effect by its last Ad Hoc Committee.250 It was this 
absolution that ultimately prompted the President to not comply with the remedial action taken 
by the Public Protector.251 
 
Aggrieved with this turn of events, the EFF and the DA launched simultaneous applications 
asking for an order: (i) affirming the legally binding effect of the Public Protector’s remedial 
action; (ii) directing the President to comply with such remedial action and (iii) declaring that 
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both the President and the National Assembly acted in breach of their constitutional 
obligations.252 
 
(ii) The legal questions 
 
The complexity of the facts gave rise to equally complex legal questions:  
• The major issue lying at the heart of the application was whether the President was bound 
to comply with the remedial action taken against him?253 
• Another key issue flowing from the core legal question was the meaning of “remedial 
action” which the President and National Assembly did not implement, ostensibly in the 
belief that it was a mere recommendation.  
 
Also arising for consideration was whether the conduct of the President, in knowingly 
deriving undue benefit from the irregular deployment of State resources in the form of non-
security upgrades installed at his private Nkandla residence; and of Parliament, in failing to 
facilitate the enforcement of the Public Protector’s report which contained unfavourable 
findings (in respect of the President’s aforementioned conduct) and the remedial action taken 
against the President in the instance, constitute a breach of their respective obligations under 
the Constitution? 
 
(iii) The reasoning of the court 
 
(a) In respect of the President’s conduct 
 
In ascertaining whether or not President Jacob Zuma ought to have complied with Thuli 
Madonsela’s remedial action, the Constitutional Court did not just engage in a mechanical 
analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions that imposed such an obligation on the 
President. Rather, it was as though the Court felt the President had forgotten, and thus had to be 
reminded, of who he was.  Consequently, several pertinent remarks were made on how the 
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President ought to have conducted himself in the circumstances. Of significance, the President, 
(as Head of State and of the National Executive) was seen as “occupying a position 
indispensable to the effective governance of a democratic South Africa.”254 The court described 
him as “a constitutional being and a national pathfinder upon whom the nation places its hopes of 
accelerating towards a peaceful, just and prosperous destination and ultimately, of being the 
personification of the country’s constitutional project.”255 It was indicated that it was specifically 
in light of this that the duty to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of 
the Republic was expressly imposed on the President alone.256 
 
This obligation, as cited in terms of section 83(b) of the Constitution, was seen as imposing an 
obligation on the President in particular (emphasis added) to do all he can in ensuring that South 
Africa has a thriving constitutional democracy.257 One of the ways through which he would be 
expected to do so was by providing support to all institutions or measures designed to strengthen 
constitutional democracy within the Republic; one of those institutions being the office of the 
Public Protector.258 
 
The question that immediately arises in light of these observations was whether, in these 
circumstances, Jacob Zuma had conducted himself in a manner that embodies how the 
quintessential President of the Republic ought to behave? The Constitutional Court was 
ultimately of the view that he had not.  
 
In assessing his conduct, and, in particular whether he had, through his conduct, failed to defend, 
uphold and respect the Constitution as the highest law in the land, it was asserted that the 
President would be found to have been in breach of this President-specific obligation where an 
entity, with powers conferred under the Constitution, exercises those powers against the 
President, in order to get the President to comply with his obligations under the Constitution, 
only for the President to deliberately flout the attempted exercise of those powers.259 
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In essence therefore, the Constitutional Court was of the view that the Public Protector, in taking 
remedial action directing the President to personally bear a reasonable cost of the non-security 
installations at his Nkandla residence, was exercising constitutional powers conferred in terms of 
section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution, in order to get the President to comply with his obligations 
under section 96 of the Constitution,260 and that the President, in preferring the outcome of a 
parallel process (in the form of the report by the Minister of Police) over the investigatory 
process initially started and concluded by the Public Protector, had consequently breached his 
constitutional obligations under sections 83(b), 96, 181 and 182(1)(c) of the Constitution.261 
 
Granted, the question as to the precise legal effect of the Public Protector’s remedial action, was, 
at the time the President so acted, still uncertain. However, as the EFF correctly contended in its 
heads of argument: the President was nonetheless obliged to comply for a reason independent of 
the status of the Public Protector’s report; namely, the President-specific constitutional 
obligations flowing from the provisions of section 83(b) of the Constitution, buttressed also by 
the constitutional values of the rule of law and accountability.262 
 
As such, the fact that the President may have been under a genuine belief that such powers were 
not binding is irrelevant. What is important is that a duty to repay the money had been 
specifically imposed on him through the Public Protector’s constitutional power.263 Thus, in 
failing to heed a directive issued in terms of a constitutionally-sourced power, the President had, 
ultimately, disobeyed the Constitution itself.  
 
(b) In assessing the role of the National Assembly  
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It has been said that the Constitutional Court, in delivering its judgment in respect of the matter 
of Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly, was not just at its most 
united and unrelenting but in so doing, exercised the full extent of its power.264 The latter is in 
reference to how the bench was forced, in determining answers to the legal questions raised, to 
tread so far deeply into the political realm; an aspect that brought into play the delicate issue of 
possible encroachment upon the separation of powers doctrine.  
 
The Constitutional Court was highly mindful of this. By its own admission, the President and 
Parliament bear very important responsibilities and each play a crucial role in the affairs of the 
country and thus deserve the space to discharge their constitutional obligations unimpeded by the 
Judiciary.265 One gets the sense, when seeing the Court’s concern at the possibility of 
encroaching upon the separation of powers (as can be gleaned from its somewhat extensive 
discussion at paragraphs 89 to 93 of the judgment), that had it had a choice in the matter, it 
would have preferred to not have to be in this position. However, it was adamant that it owes its 
allegiance only to the Constitution and that barring clear language from the Constitution itself 
(emphasis added) it would stop at nothing in ensuring that Parliament acts in accordance with‚ 
and within the limits of‚ the Constitution.266 
 
As the Constitutional Court significantly noted:   
 
[t]he National Assembly‚ and by extension Parliament‚ is the embodiment of the centuries-old dreams and 
legitimate aspirations of all our people. It is the voice of all South Africans‚ especially the poor‚ the 
voiceless and the least˗remembered. It is the watchdog of State resources‚ the enforcer of fiscal discipline 
and cost-effectiveness for the common good of all our people … In sum‚ Parliament is the mouthpiece‚ the 
eyes and the service-delivery-ensuring machinery of the people. No doubt‚ it is an irreplaceable feature of 
good governance in South Africa.267 
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Thus while “[I]t falls outside the parameters of judicial authority to prescribe to the National 
Assembly how to scrutinise executive action”,268 the Court felt: 
 
[t]here was everything wrong with the National Assembly stepping into the shoes of the Public Protector‚ 
by passing a resolution that purported effectively to nullify the findings made and remedial action taken by 
the Public Protector and replacing them with its own findings and “remedial action”. This‚ the rule of law is 
dead against. It is another way of taking the law into one’s hands and thus constitutes self-help.269 
 
The National Assembly’s resolution in which it absolved the President of compliance with the 
Public Protector’s remedial action was consequently found to be constitutionally invalid. It was 
set aside as a result.270 
 




What is interesting to note about the Court’s reasoning above is how logically possible it is to 
arrive at the conclusion that the President had breached the Constitution without even having to 
consider the question as to whether or not the Public Protector’s remedial action is binding on 
persons and organs of state. This is so as it was determined that the President was obliged to 
comply with the Public Protector’s remedial action based on the supremacy of the Constitution, 
the rule of law and considerations of accountability.  
 
The enquiry into the constitutionality of the President’s conduct could thus have been limited to 
a consideration of sections 1(c), 2, 83(b), 96 as well as 181(3) of the Constitution. After all, the 
President’s legal team had already, during a hearing in February, conceded that the Public 
Protector’s findings were binding and that the President was willing to reimburse the state.271 
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The Constitutional Court was however leaving no stone unturned. It noted that the President’s 
aforementioned concession seemed to only be in respect of the present proceedings and was not 
meant as a general proposition.272 The Court was sceptical that this would open the door for 
those against whom remedial action is taken to essentially become judges in their own cause as 
they could then make a judgment call as to whether the decision to reject the findings or remedial 
action is itself irrational, and subsequently proceed to reject the remedial action taken on the 
basis of its perceived irrationality.273 To the Chief Justice, this, on its own, was a worrisome 
possibility which was further compounded by being at odds with the rule of law.274 The Court 
thus could not pass by the golden opportunity to vindicate the office of the Public Protector that 
had presented itself in the matter of Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly. 
 
2. The court’s location of the Public Protector’s role  
 
The Court began its discussion on the Public Protector at paragraph 47 by posing the question: 
“[W]hy do we have the office of the Public Protector?” What followed was an extensive 
discussion in which the Court went on to locate the role of this institution and the importance of 
its existence within South Africa’s constitutional democracy. It was indicated that: “[t]he 
institution of the Public Protector is pivotal to the facilitation of good governance in our 
constitutional dispensation”.275 This much is evident from the institution’s title-specific 
assignation as “Public Protector”. According to the Constitutional Court: “that carefully selected 
nomenclature alone speaks volumes of the role meant to be fulfilled by this institution, especially 
in the constitutional democracy that South Africa is today”, namely how: “[I]t is supposed to 
protect the public from any conduct in State affairs or in any sphere of government that could 
result in any impropriety or prejudice”.276 
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The Court noted how in appreciation of the high sensitivity and importance of its role, and with 
regard also being had to the kind of complaints‚ institutions and personalities likely to be 
investigated, the Constitution guarantees the independence‚ impartiality‚ dignity and 
effectiveness of this institution as indispensable requirements for the proper execution of its 
mandate.277 Accordingly, this institution’s independence was taken to mean that the Public 
Protector is thus meant to not be inhibited‚ undermined or sabotaged in the execution of her 
investigative‚ reporting or remedial powers.278 Of further significance, the impartiality of the 
institution was interpreted to mean that the Office of the Public Protector is accordingly not 
meant to bow down to anybody, not even in the highest chambers or throne-rooms of raw 
executive power.279 
 
However, the protection accorded by the Constitution does not necessarily translate into practice. 
As the court astutely noted, just the mere allegation and investigation of improper or corrupt 
conduct; where such allegations and investigations are in respect of powerful public office-
bearers, will most likely be met with an antagonistic response.280 This observation naturally 
extended to a consideration of the question lying at the core of the case, namely: what should the 
legal status or effect of the Public Protector’s remedial powers be?281 
 
3. Legal status and/or effect of Public Protector’s remedial action  
 
The starting point in this regard is section 182(1) of the Constitution. This section declares that 
after the Public Protector has investigated allegations of prejudice, impropriety and improper 
conduct in state affairs or any spheres of government and reported on that conduct, she can, in 
addition, take appropriate remedial action.   
 
As has been mentioned however, the likelihood of unfavourable findings, coupled with biting 
remedial action, being readily welcomed by those investigated, especially where room exists to 
question and even avoid compliance with such remedial action, is highly improbable. Room to 
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do so existed due to the lack of an express stipulation as to what the legal status and effect of the 
Public Protector’s remedial action should be. It now fell to the country’s highest court to clarify 
and confirm the precise nature of the Public Protector’s powers under the Constitution.  
 
Mogoeng CJ, reading for a unanimous Constitutional Court, began by noting that it is 
incomprehensible just how the Public Protector could ever be effective in what she does and be 
able to contribute to the strengthening of constitutional democracy where her remedial action 
was, by design, never to have binding effect.282 To support this contention, the Court then 
proceeded to identify key factors which, in the court’s view, all gave an indication as to the 
effect the Constitution intended the Public Protector’s remedial action to have. What follows are 
the general observations made by the Constitutional Court in this regard.  
 
Firstly, Mogoeng CJ opined that the constitutional safeguards in section 181 would be 
meaningless if institutions purportedly established to strengthen constitutional democracy lacked 
even the remotest possibility to do so.283 Accordingly: “that the Public Protector is required 
under section 181(2) to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law‚ to be 
impartial and exercise her powers and perform her functions without fear‚ favour or prejudice, 
was found to be quite telling”.284 
 
Further, that the Constitution requires the Public Protector to be effective and identifies the need 
for her to be assisted and protected‚ to create a climate conducive to independence‚ impartiality‚ 
dignity and effectiveness‚ was found to indicate just how potentially intrusive her investigative 
powers are and, significantly, just how deep the remedial powers are expected to cut.285 It was 
argued that this obligation under section 181(3) of the Constitution, to assist and protect the 
Public Protector so as to ensure her dignity and effectiveness, was relevant to the enforcement of 
her remedial action in that the Public Protector would arguably have no dignity and be 
ineffective if her directives could be ignored willy-nilly.286  
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The Court also noted that, under section 182(1) of the Constitution, complaints are lodged with 
the Public Protector to cure incidents of impropriety‚ prejudice‚ unlawful enrichment or 
corruption in government circles.287 Mogoeng CJ noted that the Office of the Public Protector in 
particular was constitutionally empowered to address these specific types of complaints as it was 
constitutionally conceived with the view to facilitating the observance of the constitutional 
values and principles necessary to ensure that efficient‚ economic and effective use of resources 
is promoted; that accountability finds expression; and also that high standards of professional 
ethics are promoted and maintained.288 As the observance of these constitutional prescripts is 
crucial to the preservation of constitutional democracy, the Public Protector’s effective discharge 
of her mandate in these areas, would, according to the Chief Justice, consequently require a 
difference-making and responsive remedial action.289 In making its final general observations on 
the matter, with a view to shedding light on what difference-making and responsive remedial 
action would entail, the Court then focused its attention on interpreting the meaning of to “take 
appropriate remedial action”.  
 
The Court engaged in a contextual approach in interpreting section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
In terms of this approach, a statutory provision is not just interpreted strictly based on its textual 
location or literal meaning but in light of its context, which includes taking into account external 
factors such as surrounding constitutional provisions.290As it is a purpose-oriented approach, it is 
more suited to give rise to an interpretation that gives effect to, and is in line with, the purport 
and objects of the Constitution.  
 
The Court accordingly interpreted section 182(1)(c) in conjunction with section 181 (in 
particular with section 181(3)) which asserts that, organs of state must, among other things, seek 
to protect the effectiveness of Chapter Nine institutions. Mogoeng CJ asserted in this respect 
that: “take appropriate remedial action” and “effectiveness” are operative words essential for the 
fulfilment of the Public Protector’s constitutional mandate as one cannot really talk about 
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effective remedial action unless a remedy in the true sense is provided to address a complaint in 
a meaningful way.291 
 
According to the Constitutional Court, this entails taking remedial action that is much more 
significant than making a mere endeavour to address complaints or that is so ineffectual as to put 
its implementation at the mercy of those against whom such remedial action is taken. Rather, it 
connotes providing a proper‚ fitting‚ suitable and effective remedy for whatever complaint and 
against whomsoever the Public Protector is called upon to investigate.292 Ultimately, the Court 
averred that remedial action can only be effective if it is binding.293 
 
The Court was however not prepared to make this a hard and fast rule. Such a finding 
presupposes the notion that whoever assumes office as Public Protector can be relied upon to be 
prudent in exercising such an unfettered discretion. As this cannot be completely guaranteed, a 
pronouncement to this effect would have placed the implementation of section 182(1)(c) at the 
subjective whim of whoever is the Public Protector at the time, thereby opening room for the 
taking of binding remedial action in circumstances where doing so would be highly unwarranted.  
 
Also flowing from this is the even more ominous possibility of the destructive and regressive 
effect that the unbridled exercise of the power to take binding remedial action would have where 
such authority cannot be challenged once taken. It would leave the Public Protector with ultimate 
power as the investigator, the jury and final judge. This would have resulted in the worsening of 
the same situation that this institution is constitutionally tasked to avoid; through having an 
unchecked Public Protector ironically tasked with checking the unchecked exercise of state 
power.  
 
What now fell to be determined was just how deeply this power to take binding and enforceable 
remedial action should be allowed to run. Accordingly, the Court reassuringly asserted that the 
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Public Protector’s power is not absolute as it is limited in the same manner that any exercise of 
public power is limited, in that the remedial action is always open to judicial scrutiny.294 
 
Ultimately, the Court held that though wide, the Public Protector’s remedial action is certainly 
not unfettered, and neither is it inflexible in its application. Instead, it is situational.295 What legal 
effect remedial action (appropriately taken) will have in a particular case would depend on the 
nature of the issues under investigation and the findings made.296  
 
It was however specified that where binding remedial action is appropriately taken, compliance 
is not optional‚ whatever reservations the affected party might have about its fairness‚ 
appropriateness or lawfulness because the country’s constitutional order hinges also on the rule 
of law which means that no binding and constitutionally or statutorily sourced decision may be 
disregarded willy-nilly.297 
 
As the rule of law dictates that obedience with decisions made by those clothed with the legal 
authority to make them is mandatory (short of such decisions being successfully challenged vis-
à-vis a judicial process), the remedial action that was taken against the President was 
consequently held to have binding effect.298 It thus fell to the President to comply through the 
taking of concrete and specific steps in line with the remedial action taken against him as much 
more than a mere preference for his own view was required.299 In this instance, a branch of 
government vested with the authority to resolve disputes by the application of the law should 
have been approached; and that is the Judiciary.300 
 
As has been mentioned, the President did not challenge the report through a judicial process but 
instead mandated the Minister of Police to investigate and report on the correctness of the 
remedial action taken against him by the Public Protector.301 This report, which was 
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subsequently endorsed by the National Assembly, essentially exonerated the President from the 
already determined liability through its (incomprehensible) finding that elements of the upgrades 
identified by the Public Protector as non-security features‚ were in fact security features for 
which the President did not have to pay. As a result, the President proceeded to consider himself 
lawfully absolved of all liability.302 To this, the Constitutional Court significantly remarked:  
 
[A]nd this is where and how the Public Protector’s remedial action was second-guessed in a manner that is 
not sanctioned by the rule of law303 in that only after a court of law had set aside the findings and remedial 
action taken by the Public Protector would it have been open to the President to disregard the Public 
Protector’s report.304 
 
These observations resulted in the Court making a specific finding to the effect that the President 
failed to uphold‚ defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. This was 
manifest firstly, from the substantial disregard for the remedial action taken against him by the 
Public Protector in terms of her constitutional powers; and secondly, from his failure to act in 
terms of his obligations, in terms of section 181(3) in respect of which he was duty bound to, but 
did not‚ assist and protect the Public Protector so as to ensure her independence‚ impartiality‚ 





Where the Supreme Court of Appeal stopped short of explicitly finding that non-compliance 
with the Public Protector’s remedial action by the Minister of Communications et al amounted to 
a constitutional breach, the unanimous finding of the Constitutional Court was that the 
President’s actions were inconsistent with his duty towards the Constitution as the supreme law 
of the country. An order was made in the result, namely that the President’s failure to comply 
with the remedial action taken against him by the Public Protector in her 19 March 2014 report 
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was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.306 The message was simple but clear: yes, you 




The findings made by the Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly show the corrosive effect of misconceived notions of political invincibility 
and the resulting disdainful disregard for the rule of law which has very damaging and far-
reaching negative consequences especially upon a state whose existence is predicated upon the 
maintenance of, and respect for, the rule of law.307 The Constitutional Court has itself noted that 
the continued survival of South Africa’s democracy rests squarely upon specific core values of 
accountability, supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, which were adopted as 
foundational values in order to make a decisive break from the unchecked abuse of state power 
and resources that was virtually institutionalised during the apartheid era.308  
 
The question does come to mind however (particularly in light of the reasoning employed by the 
Western Cape High Court in Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation 
which was in sharp contrast with that of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court in South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance and in Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly) concerning the need for and utility of 
binding and legally enforceable remedial power in getting senior public functionaries to be 
accountable for their decisions.  
 
In her affidavit filed in respect of the Western Cape High Court’s hearing into allegations of 
corporate governance failures, maladministration and undue political interference in the affairs of 
the SABC, Advocate Madonsela not only asked the court to refrain from pronouncing on the 
correctness of her findings or the remedial action contained in the report but also to assess the 
matter on the basis that her report is legally valid, binding and enforceable.309 This request was 
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made despite the lack of an express stipulation at that point (either in law or by the courts), as to 
whether the Public Protector’s findings and remedial action were actually binding. The question 
that arises therefore is: had the Public Protector been acting beyond her powers due to a 
misinterpretation of the nature of her office’s powers under the Constitution? This study shall, in 
seeking to answer this question, turn to considering whether such powers should be reviewed in 
terms of the principle of legality instead.  
 




As has been pointed out above, the legality approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in its judgment in Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of South Africa.310 This 
judgment is discussed below. 
 
4.2 Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of South Africa 
 
(i) The facts 
 
The facts as they appear from the case are as follows: Mr Marimi, who was an employee of the 
Department of Home Affairs and who had been stationed at the South African embassy in Cuba 
as the first secretary, lodged a complaint with the Office of the Public Protector. In his complaint 
Mr Marimi alleged that the Department had engaged in acts of maladministration when it 
recalled him from Cuba back to South Africa. These acts of maladministration, Mr Marimi 
alleged further, arose out of the fact that while he was stationed in Cuba, the Cuban government 
had submitted a written complaint about his behaviour to the South African ambassador.  
Although the Cuban government did not insist that action should be taken against Mr Marimi, he 
was recalled to South Africa and informed that disciplinary action would be taken against him. In 
addition, his cost of living allowance was withdrawn. 
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Despite the fact that the Department informed Mr Marimi that disciplinary action would be taken 
against him and that his attorney wrote several letters to the Department requesting it to finalise 
the matter, the Department did not do so. In the face of this lack of action on the part of the 
Department, he turned to the Office of the Public Protector and lodged his complaint. In his 
complaint, Mr Marimi argued that the Department had acted unfairly when it recalled him; that it 
had acted improperly when it withdrew his cost of living allowance; and that the delays in 
finalising his disciplinary matter had prejudiced his reputation.   
 
After receiving Mr Marimi’s complaint, the Public Protector carried out an investigation and 
found that his complaints were valid. Apart from finding that Mr Marimi’s complaints were 
valid, the Public Protector also took remedial action against the Department. In this respect, the 
Public Protector directed the Director-General of the Department to: (a) ensure that Mr Marimi’s 
cost of living allowance was paid, together with interest thereon, from the date of his recall from 
Cuba; (b) investigate the reasons for Mr Marimi’s disciplinary hearing not being dealt with 
timeously; and (c) ensure that a written letter of apology was sent to Mr Marimi. 
 
Instead of complying with the remedial action taken by the Public Protector, however, the 
Minister of Home Affairs and the Director-General applied to the Gauteng North High Court to 
review and set aside the Public Protector’s report, her findings and the remedial action she 
took.311 This application, however, was dismissed by the High Court and the Minister and 
Director-General then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
(ii) The legal question 
 
The key legal question that had to be decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal was whether the 
remedial action taken by the Public Protector should be reviewed on the grounds that it infringed 
the PAJA or the principle of legality.312 
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(iii) The reasoning of the Court 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (per Plasket AJA; Lewis JA, Majiedt, JA, Willis JA and Mothle 
AJA concurring) dismissed the appeal. In arriving at this decision, the Court began by stating 
that review in terms of both PAJA and the principle of legality stem from the principle of the rule 
of law.313 While the right to administrative justice in the Constitution and PAJA give effect to the 
rule of law in respect only of administrative action, the principle of legality gives effect to the 
rule of law in respect of every other exercise of public power.314 
 
It is important to note, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated further, that an applicant for 
judicial review does not have a choice as to which route to follow. If the decision which is being 
challenged falls into the definition of “administrative action”, then the application must be made 
in terms of PAJA; if, however, the challenged decision does not fall into the definition of 
“administrative action”, then the application must be made in terms of the principle of legality.315 
 
In its earlier decision in South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal went on to state, it was not required to decide whether remedial action 
taken by the Public Protector fell into the definition of “administrative action” and the question 
was left open.316 In South African Reserve Bank v Public Protector of South Africa and in ABSA 
Bank Ltd v Public Protector of South Africa, however, the Gauteng North High Court had held 
that remedial action taken by the Public Protector did fall into the definition of “administrative 
action” and, therefore, had to be reviewed in terms of PAJA.317  
 
In order to determine whether the approach adopted in these judgments was correct, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal stated, it was necessary to determine whether remedial action taken by the 
Public Protector satisfied all of the elements of “administration action” as that concept is defined 
in section 1 of PAJA. These elements are, namely: (a) a decision of an administrative nature, (b) 
                                                          
313 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA) at para 27. 
314 Ibid. 
315 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA) at para 28. 




taken by an organ of state, (c) when it exercises either a constitutional power or a public power 
in terms of legislation, (d) that adversely affects rights and (e) has a direct, external legal 
effect.318 
 
A careful examination of the constitutional status of the Office of the Public Protector as well as 
the source and effect of her remedial powers, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated, clearly 
showed that it did satisfy elements (b) to (e) of the definition of “administrative action”. This is 
because the Public Protector is an organ of state that exercises public power in terms of both the 
Constitution and legislation. In addition, any adverse finding made by the Public Protector 
coupled with a decision to take remedial action will usually adversely affect the right of the 
implicated body or person and have a direct external affect.319    
 
The key question, therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeal went on to declare, was whether a 
decision by the Public Protect to take remedial action was of an administrative nature. Insofar as 
this question was concerned, the Court held that while it was prepared to accept “public 
administration in a modern state encompasses an extremely wide range of activities, including 
investigative functions and the exercise of powers of compunction”, it was not prepared to accept 
that the decision of the Public Protector was of an administrative nature. The Court advanced  a 
number of reasons for this position, as follows:320 
 
• First, the Office of the Public Protector was an independent institution aimed at 
strengthening constitutional democracy in South Africa. It was not, therefore, part of the 
executive or the public administration. 
• Second, given its unique role as an independent institution aimed at strengthening 
constitutional democracy in South Africa, it was not accountable to the executive, but 
only to the National Assembly. 
• Third, although the State Liability Act applied to the Office of the Public Protector, it is 
not a department of state. The only reason it falls into the definition of an organ of state 
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in section 239 of the Constitution is because it exercises constitutional and statutory 
powers. 
• Fourth, the function of the Office of the Public Protector is not to carry out the day-to-day 
administrative tasks of the state, but rather to investigate, report and remedy 
maladministration among other organs of state (excluding the courts). 
• Lastly, the Office of the Public Protector is given broad discretionary powers as to what 
complaints to accept, what complaints to investigate, how to investigate them and what 
remedies to take.321  
 
Given that decisions made by the Public Protector do not fall into the definition of administrative 
action, the Supreme Court of Appeal, then concluded that her decision to take remedial action 
could not be reviewed in terms of PAJA. Instead, it had to be reviewed in terms of the principle 
of legality.322 After having come to this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal then turned to 
review the Public Protector’s decision to take remedial action against the Director-General. In 





As Murcott and Van der Westhuizen have pointed out, it is difficult to find fault with the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s “careful characterisation of the Public Protector's powers as not 
administrative in nature, and thus falling to be reviewed in terms of legality as opposed to 
PAJA”.323 Apart from correctly classifying the Public Protector’s remedial power as non-
administrative and thus subject to review in terms of the principle of legality, another important 
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What emerges from the above discussion is that the Public Protector moves and functions as an 
administrative body.324 Among other factors, the Office of the Public Protector must comply 
with the constitutional and statutory obligations that deal with just administrative action in that 
the Public Protector’s actions and conduct must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.325 
However, care must be taken to not glibly regard the Public Protector’s exercise of her powers 
under section 182(1) of the Constitution as strictly entailing administrative action or being 
administrative in nature in terms of PAJA. The recently appointed Public Protector, Advocate 
Busisiwe Mkhwebane, when quizzed326 indicated that: to say that whenever the Public Protector 
performs her constitutional mandate, she is performing what is called an “administrative action” 
would severely limit the office. Clearly, such a strict or narrow categorization does not factor in 
the pliability of the institution. It also does not take into account the fact that it is multi-faceted 
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In South Africa’s current constitutional dispensation, courts have emerged as vital fora for 
buttressing constitutional democracy within the Republic. The Constitutional Court in particular 
has, over the years, handed down seminal rulings that affirm its centrality in ensuring that 
constitutional guarantees reach down to all as well as in enforcing the rule of law over all 
executive action.328 
 
More recently, the Constitutional Court’s ruling in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly marked a sombre moment in the country’s recent political history with its 
finding that the first citizen of the country had disobeyed the highest law in the land by refusing 
to comply with directives issued by the Public Protector in terms of the institution’s powers 
under section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution. Corruption Watch, who joined the proceedings as 
amicus curiae, have since described the judgment as:  
 
[a] stunning show of judicial independence in which the Constitutional Court sent out a strong message that 
being politically powerful – even being the president of a country – will not get you off the hook if you 
abuse your position and public resources.329 
 
Of particular significance was the mastery of the language and legal poetry that characterised the 
judgment as seen, for example, in the very first paragraph of what was a unanimous judgement 
where the Constitutional Court noted how accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy of 
the Constitution were adopted as foundational values of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
It was asserted, significantly, that:  
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[A]s such, public office-bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at their peril because 
constitutionalism‚ accountability and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that stands 
ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck.330 
 
It was this use of prose bordering on poetry that illuminated the irrefutable facts concerning 
“Nkandlagate” in a manner that was to leave the gory details permanently imprinted upon the 
nation’s psyche in what has been described as: “[t]he worst indictment of the head of state in a 
democratic South Africa”.331 The Court’s vivid description of the Public Protector,  giving the 
impression that South Africa’s constitutional order cannot afford to have an ineffectual Public 
Protector, is remarkable. The Court, in considering the centrality of this institution to the 
consolidation and sustenance of constitutional democracy within the Republic averred, firstly, 
that “[T]he Public Protector is one of the true crusaders and champions of anti˗corruption and 
clean governance” and, even more significantly, that: “[S]he is the embodiment of a biblical 
David‚ that the public is‚ who fights the most powerful and very well-resourced Goliath‚ that 
impropriety and corruption by government officials are”.332 
 
The language used by the Constitutional Court here was clear, deliberate and unequivocal. It 
shows how the Constitutional Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, 
has become more robust in challenging and reprimanding flagrant contraventions of the 
Constitution and how accordingly, it will not bow down to pressure from anybody in ensuring 
respect for, and adherence to, the dictates of the Constitution. More specifically for the purposes 
of this study, it is also indicative of the court’s increased concern with the pathologies associated 
with a dominant party democracy as mentioned in Chapter One and Two of this study and how 
these pathologies create a climate conducive for rampant corruption.  
 
The Constitutional Court, in cognizance of these factors, was thus indicating in this instance, that 
it becomes imperative to have formidable independent institutions of governance (other than the 
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courts), such as the Public Protector, in order to more effectively tackle these pathologies. 
Towards this end, it held that the Public Protector does, in fact, have the power to make binding 
remedial orders and confirmed that her decisions cannot simply be disregarded by asserting that 
absent a review, an errant organ of state is obliged to comply with her directives once the Public 
Protector had finally spoken. This judgment thus elevated the status of the institution of the 
Public Protector by singling it out as arguably the most visible constitutionally backed institution 
that is aimed at assisting in strengthening democracy in the Republic by dealing with various 
forms of official misconduct, including corrupt practices.333 
 
It would seem therefore that the Constitutional Court’s ruling on Nkandla was a sound judgment 
on the basis of public policy. This is especially so when taking into account the loud hue and cry 
when “Nkandlagate” broke. The public’s vociferous rejection of the huge expenditure on a 
private residence that was not even going to remain  state property at the end of the President’s 
tenure, resulting in the hashtags #Zumamustpay and #Zumamustgo trending on various social 
media platforms in the country, is evidence of this fact. 
  
A finding to the contrary could thus have had far- reaching negative consequences as it would 
have most likely triggered an unprecedented wave of protest marches and unrest within the 
country. This possibility is not far-fetched seeing as this case was considered at a time when the 
country was still reeling from a string of protests such as the “Rhodes must fall” movement and 
the recent “Fees must fall” movement which burst out at various tertiary institutions across the 
country sometime in October 2015 and which even saw violent clashes between students and riot 
police. In short, this case could not have been decided at a more sensitive and politically charged 
time in South Africa’s recent history.   
 
It therefore behoves one to ask: did the bench surreptitiously bow down to public opinion in 
handing down its judgment so as to save the reputation of the Constitutional Court?334 Was the 
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Constitutional Court correct in finding that the President’s conduct in refusing  to comply with 
the remedial action taken against him by the Public Protector was illegal given that there was 
legal uncertainty concerning this aspect at the time that the President so acted? As Deputy 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development John Jeffrey stated: prior to that 
determination, there was no legal certainty on the matter of whether the Public Protector’s 
remedial action was binding or not and it was upon this legal uncertainty that events unfolded 
exactly as they did.335  This study shall, in this vein, now set out to engage with the criticisms 
that have been levelled against the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly judgement.  
 
2. Academic commentary: A different perspective  
 
(a) Consensus before Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 
 
Prior to the handing down of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in South African 
Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance and the Constitutional Court’s subsequent 
confirmation of that ruling in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly, 
academic consensus was that the Public Protector’s remedial power was essentially non-binding.  
 
The widely accepted definition of an ombudsman (on whose role and model the South African 
Public Protector is based), as provided by the International Bar Association in a resolution 
adopted in August 1974, is that the ideal ombudsman is characterised by, inter alia, the 
following factors: it is an official office; whose investigations are officially sanctioned and 
enforced; with the exception that the ombudsman does not take remedial action himself, but 
instead makes recommendations and reports (emphasis added).336 
 
Baxter adds in this respect, albeit that he was writing in 1984, that one of the main reasons for 
the ombudsman’s success is that he takes no remedial action himself but rather relies on his 
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independence, objectivity and prestige.337 The Western Cape High Court in Democratic Alliance 
v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd and Others338 confirmed this academic consensus 
by asserting that ombudsmen ordinarily do not possess any powers of legal enforcement; rather, 
the key technique of the ombudsman is one of intellectual authority (making logically consistent 
and defensible findings) and powers of persuasion.339 
 
While one would expect this to have the adverse effect of weakening the institution, Woolman 
notes that: “[I]n point of fact, the ability of the Public Protector to investigate and report 
effectively – without making binding decisions – is the real measure of its strength (emphasis 
added)”.340 The argument is that the fact that he does not pose a direct threat enhances the mutual 
understanding and co-operation between him and the public administration, which is so essential 
to the ombudsman’s work.341 
 
This view also had support from political figures. The point arose for consideration at a 
colloquium on the Public Protector held on the 4th of February 2016 at the University of Pretoria. 
On the panel was retired Justice of the Constitutional Court, Zak Yacoob who began his speech 
by clarifying that nowhere in the world are the ombudsman’s powers binding, therefore the 
words “take appropriate action” should be taken to mean that the Public Protector has the right to 
decide what the appropriate action to be taken is and not that such action is necessarily binding 
and enforceable.342 
 
Justice Yacoob’s sentiments were shared by the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, John Jeffrey who questioned the need for the Public Protector’s powers to be 
binding as government, by Madonsela’s own concession, implemented an extremely high 
percentage of her recommendations anyway.343 The Honourable Minister’s view was that the 
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institution is not a quasi-judicial body and its decisions should therefore not hold the same 
weight as the courts.344 In effect, he stated that if the Public Protector’s decisions were to be 
binding then not only would there be no need for the courts, but the Public Protector would wield 
too much power as she would then essentially be an investigator, prosecutor and judge all rolled 
into one.345 
 
Essentially, the general sentiment, particularly among senior government officials was that the 
Public Protector’s findings were merely recommendations that did not create a binding legal 
obligation on them to act. This has been largely due to a gap in the law in the form of the lack of 
a clear and decisive enunciation on the legal status and effect of the Public Protector’s remedial 
power. Reliance was placed on the fact that the word “binding” did not accompany the Public 
Protector’s right to take appropriate remedial action under section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
Further reliance was placed on the fact that the Public Protector Act is silent as to whether or not 
the Public Protector’s findings and remedial action are binding on persons and organs of state.  
The phrase “appropriate remedial action”, which has since been described by the Constitutional 
Court as operative words essential for the fulfilment of the Public Protector’s constitutional 
mandate,346 is in fact, not elaborated on at all throughout the Act. This significant loophole has 
rendered the Act susceptible to manipulative interpretations by those wishing to evade 
responsibility especially where unfavourable findings of impropriety or maladministration have 
been made.347 
 
As shown in Chapter Three of this study, there has now been a remarkable reversal of this 
position in the form of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in South African Broadcasting 
Corporation v Democratic Alliance as well as the Constitutional Court’s subsequent 
confirmation of this judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
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Assembly. In both instances, it was found that the Public Protector’s remedial orders are legally 
binding. The Constitutional Court’s vindication of the binding nature of the Public Protector’s 
remedial power on one hand, came across as a watershed moment in South Africa’s recent 
constitutional democratic history and, on the other hand, as a dramatic change to the country’s 
political and legal landscape. Not surprisingly, this opened the judgment to a fair amount of 
criticism.  
 
The view shared by Baxter and Woolman cited above (that the Public Protector’s remedial power 
is, and should remain non-binding) also found support in scholars such as Bishop, Brickill and 
Moshikaro following the handing down of the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly judgment. According to Bishop et al:  
 
treating the remedial action of the Public Protector as binding shifts the role of the Public Protector and her 
relationship with organs of state into a conflictual rather than constructive dynamic. If one were rather to 
adopt the approach that remedial action is not binding but does require a lawful response – which must be 
rational, reasonable and not infringe constitutional rights – one would avoid the inevitability of such 
decisions being taken on review.348 
 
In adopting the stance that remedial action ought to be non-binding but must be met with a 
lawful response that is rational and reasonable, Bishop et al essentially echoed the sentiments of 
the Western Cape High Court in the DA v SABC case. To be clear, on the facts of the Nkandla 
matter this would have meant that President Zuma was required to respond to the remedial action 
with a concrete decision, albeit that it might subsequently be subject to review.349. In this regard, 
Schippers J asserted that:  
 
before rejecting the findings or remedial action of the Public Protector, the relevant organ of state must 
have cogent reasons for doing so, that is, for reasons other than a mere preference for its own view”350 [and 
further that:] “there can be no question that a decision whether or not to accept the findings or remedial 
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action of the Public Protector constitutes the exercise of a public power of which rationality is a minimum 
threshold.351 
 
Notably, in levelling criticism against the Constitutional Court’s Nkandla ruling, Bishop et al 
note that just days before the hearing, President Zuma seemingly saw the writing on the wall and 
submitted a draft order to the parties (subsequently revised), conceding large parts of the relief 
sought, a capitulation which they believe encouraged the Court to reach the decision that the 
Public Protector's remedial action was binding.352  
 
In this regard, Mogoeng CJ had noted that the President’s concession that the Public Protector’s 
powers are binding seemed to only be in respect of the present proceedings and was not meant as 
a general proposition.353 As was indicated in Chapter Three, the Chief Justice was sceptical that 
this would open the door for those against whom remedial action is taken to essentially become 
judges in their own cause as they could make a judgment call as to whether the decision, findings 
or remedial action is irrational, and subsequently proceed to reject the remedial action taken on 
that basis.354 Mogoeng CJ highlighted that this was a worrisome possibility,  further compounded 
by being at odds with the rule of law.355 
 
Bishop et al, however, reject this view by taking the opinion that based on the Court’s approach:  
 
the focus will now tend to be on the process and substantive content of the Public Protector's decision, 
when taken on review whereas on the alternative approach,356 all eyes – including those of a court if 
litigation did follow – would be on the organ of state against whom the remedial action was directed.357  
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In making their final remarks on the matter, Bishop et al contend that, as such:  
 
the finding that remedial action may be binding and therefore subject to judicial review is wrong having 
regard both to the text of the Constitution and the purpose and role of the institution of the Public Protector 
as there is nothing in the text of the Constitution that requires ‘remedial action’ to connote an effective 
remedy akin to the judicial remedies to which persons whose constitutional rights are violated are entitled 
under s 38 of the Constitution.358  
 
(b) The position after Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 
 
(i) Introduction  
 
In the fledgling constitutional democracy that South Africa is (by African and to some extent, 
international standards), it is inevitable that “challenges posed by economic transformation 
(within a racially polarized capitalist economy which creates opportunities for careerism, 
personal enrichment and corruption) will continue to exist.”359 This has served to thrust the role 
of the institution of the Public Protector into deepening democracy through, inter alia, efforts at 
uprooting the cancer of corruption within the country, into the spotlight. One of the ways through 
which the effectiveness of the Public Protector’s office in discharging this role is measured is 
through the implementation rate of its recommendations given in exercise of the Public 
Protector’s remedial power.360 While it has been noted that “recommendations given in respect 
of ‘small cases’ are often implemented without much difficulty,”361 the institution has, 
oftentimes, faced great difficulty in getting its recommendations followed upon, particularly 
where remedial action would have been taken against high ranking public officials in respect of 
cases involving serious allegations of public misadministration.362 It is in this light that this study 
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Parliament’s ad hoc committee looking into the fitness of the SABC board, that the public broadcaster ignored six 
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rejects the criticisms levelled against the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly judgment. The specific reasons for this are set out below.  
 
(ii) A case for binding remedial power  
 
The first major premise upon which this study rejects the arguments from academic 
commentators, is based upon Bishop et al’s contention that the Public Protector’s remedial action 
cannot be binding and therefore subject to judicial review, as “[t]here is nothing in the text of the 
Constitution that requires ‘remedial action’ to connote an effective remedy akin to judicial 
remedies of the courts”.363 As the Supreme Court of Appeal itself has noted: a court is an 
inaccurate comparator for the Office of the Public Protector.364 It is worth noting that there have 
been contrasting views as to whether Chapter Nine Institutions are state institutions separate 
from government or constitute a fourth arm of government incorporated to aid the trias politicas 
framework in preventing abuses of power. Proponents of this argument such as Klug365 are of the 
view that only their location within the realm of the separation of powers secures their potential 
as an essential part of the constitutional system of accountability established by the Constitution.  
 
Judgments handed down by the Constitutional Court, particularly the Independent Electoral 
Commission case, have provided clarity in this respect. Here the Constitutional Court held that 
under section 181(2) of the Constitution, these institutions are independent and subject only to 
the Constitution and the law; independence cannot exist in the air and it is clear that Chapter 
Nine intends independence to refer to independence from the government.366 Regarding Chapter 
Nine Institutions as a fourth arm of government is misleading as it is a contradiction in terms to 
regard an independent institution as part of a sphere of government that is functionally 
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interdependent and interrelated in relation to all other spheres of government.367 As such, it can 
be concluded that although these institutions are accountable to the National Assembly, and must 
report on their activities and the performance of their functions at least once a year to the 
Assembly, they do not constitute an additional arm of government. Identifying them as an 
intrinsic part of the separation of powers framework would be erroneous as doing so defeats the 
purpose of their existence. As the Constitutional Court has itself noted, it is therefore essential, 
not just for them to actually be outside of government, but also that they should manifestly be 
seen to be, outside of government.368 It would therefore be erroneous to attempt to glean the legal 
nature of the Public Protector’s powers by weighing it against an institution that constitutes a 
branch of government.   
 
More significantly, the South African Public Protector cannot be regarded as an ordinary 
ombudsman as was contended by the High Court in arguing that the Public Protector’s powers 
are not binding and enforceable since ombudsmen ordinarily do not possess any powers of legal 
enforcement. This premise is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the history that 
necessitated the need for the Public Protector’s office and other Chapter Nine Institutions and 
consequently, of the Public Protector’s place in South Africa’s democracy.  
 
It has been noted that the meaning, roles, and functions associated with ombudsmen and 
ombudsmen-like institutions will vary in accordance with the environment in which the office is 
established and operates.369 As such, what the Public Protector means to South Africa is 
markedly different from what a similar institution in a different jurisdiction would mean. 
Regarding the Public Protector as an ordinary ombudsman who should only have mere powers of 
recommendation therefore totally discounts the political climate in which the South African 
Public Protector currently exists and operates.  
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According to Adetiba, neo-patrimonialism best defines the existing leadership structure in South 
Africa370 wherein state institutions such as the NPA, SASSA, ESKOM and the SABC among 
others, are “captured” by senior government officials for the purposes of furthering their personal 
interests as well as of those who provide them with financial backing. In such a system of 
patronage, it is imperative for the Public Protector to be seen as having teeth as this system on 
one hand, creates an avenue for corruption, and on the other, makes it difficult to address the 
problem.371 
 
The second premise upon which this study rejects the submissions made by academic 
commentators cited above is based on their contention that: “[t]reating the remedial action of the 
Public Protector as binding shifts the role of the Public Protector and her relationship with organs 
of state into a conflictual rather than constructive dynamic”.372 Regarding this view, the Public 
Protector’s investigations into Mr Motsoeneng’s permanent appointment as the Chief Executive 
Officer of the SABC as well as her investigations into non-security upgrades at Mr Zuma’s 
private Nkandla residence at taxpayer’s expense have shown how senior public functionaries 
almost always have a disdainful regard of the Public Protector’s remedial action. This is so 
particularly where they hold the view that it is non-binding which fosters the sentiment that they 
are therefore not compelled to comply rather than resulting in any “constructive dynamic”.  This 
study accordingly submits that the Constitutional Court’s position is to be preferred as it places 
the initiative on the party found guilty of maladministration to take the remedial action on 
judicial review. The implicated party will thus have to take the risk of paying for litigation as 
well as taking the chance of possibly losing the case and then having to meet the costs of counsel 
for both parties. Placing the onus on the implicated party or organ of state may thus promote 
accountability as it could coerce them to comply with the remedial action in order to avoid the 
uncertain outcome associated with resorting to litigation.  
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On the alternative approach, the burden would have to be on civil society, private individuals or 
on the Office of the Public Protector itself to take the guilty party to court in order to force them 
to comply with remedial action taken against them and get them to account for their actions. 
Such a situation is clearly untenable in light of the delay or lengthy duration that court 
proceedings are often prone to. Ultimately, it does not foster respect for the Public Protector’s 
remedial power since, in terms of this approach guilty parties have to be taken to court first for 
them to comply, whereas where remedial action is binding, public functionaries found guilty of 
maladministration and corruption have to comply with the remedial action the instant it is taken 
as it binds and stands until reviewed and set aside in judicial proceedings. 
 
(iii) On reviewing the Public Protector’s binding remedial orders 
 
There has been a reversal of the general consensus regarding the nature of the Public Protector’s 
remedial power and the basis upon which the Public Protector’s power should be reviewed. This 
reversal came in the form of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Minister of Home Affairs 
v Public Protector of South Africa.373 
 
Prior to the handing down of this decision, the general consensus seemed to be that the exercise 
of the Public Protector’s power under section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution is administrative in 
nature and thus falls to be reviewed in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (“PAJA”).  This much is corroborated by previous decisions that all found that remedial 
orders by the Public Protector constitute administrative action. The court a quo374 in the matter 
between the Minister of Home Affairs and the Public Protector found that the Public Protector’s 
powers were reviewable under the PAJA. The North Gauteng High Court in South African 
Reserve Bank v Public Protector and Others375 (“the SARB decision”) also reviewed and set 
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aside the Public Protector’s remedial action in terms of the PAJA.376 Finally, in Absa Bank 
Limited & others v Public Protector & others,377 it was also found that remedial action by the 
Public Protector is subject to review under the PAJA.378 However, as shown in Chapter Three of 
this study, it was the Court’s finding in Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of South 
Africa (at paragraph 37) that “the PAJA does not apply to the review of exercise of power by the 
Public Protector in terms of s 182 of the Constitution and s 6 of the Public Protector Act” but that 
the principle of legality applies instead.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appointed Public Protector, Advocate Mkhwebane issued a report on 19 June 2017 of her investigation into 
government’s alleged failure in 1999 to recover misappropriated funds and implement the CIEX report. The report 
essentially found that the government had failed to recoup R1 125 billion as opposed to the R3.2 billion initially 
mooted in the CIEX report. The non-recovery of any repayment of the “lifeboat” was seen as being irregular and 
unjust on the basis that the Reserve Bank had a responsibility to apply public funding to the benefit of the South 
African economy and its people. The Public Protector, pursuant to section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution, then 
recommended the alteration of the Reserve Bank’s mandate under section 224 of the Constitution from protecting 
the value of the currency to that of  “promoting balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic while 
ensuring the protection of the socio-economic well-being of the citizens through regular consultation with 
Parliament as opposed to regular consultation between the Bank and the Minister of Finance”. See also: B 
Mkhwebane “Alleged failure to recover misappropriated funds: report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration, corruption, misappropriation of public funds and failure by the South African Government to 
implement the CIEX report and to recover public funds from Absa Bank” Report No. 8 of 2017/2018. 
376 In this instance, the Public Protector’s remedial action was reviewed and set aside in terms of: (I) section 
6(2)(a)(i) of the PAJA on the ground that the Public Protector was not authorised by section 182(1) of the 
Constitution (the empowering provision), to take such remedial action as the remedial power had been exercised in 
respect of an aspect that had not been identified for investigation in the report; (II) section  6(2)(i) of the PAJA on 
the basis that the remedial action taken was unconstitutional seeing as the Public Protector’s order in not only 
directing Parliament to amend the Constitution, but in also going as far as prescribing the wording of that 
amendment was seen as offending the separation of powers principle; (III) sections 6(2)(f)(ii) of the PAJA for 
irrationality and section 6(2)(h) of the PAJA for unreasonableness  on the basis that it was not rationally related or 
connected to the evidence and information before the Public Protector and the reasons given for it and unreasonable 
in that no other reasonable person would have taken it; and finally, (IV) on the ground of procedural unfairness in 
terms of section 6(2)(c) of the PAJA as the Public Protector had not disclosed that that she was considering remedial 
action that would amend the primary object of the Reserve Bank and also because she had amended the scope of the 
investigation and the remedial action in the final report without notice to any person likely to be adversely affected.  
377 [2018] 2 All SA 1.  
378 Here the South African Reserve Bank had brought an application for the review and setting aside of paragraph 
7.1 of Advocate Mkhwebane’s Alleged failure to recover misappropriated funds Report No. 8 of 2017/2018 in 
which the Public Protector inter alia instructed the Special Investigating Unit to re-open the investigation into 
alleged misappropriated public funds unlawfully given to ABSA Bank in the amount of R1 125 billion. Absa Bank 
Ltd and the Reserve Bank (1st and 2nd applicant respectively) had brought the application in terms of the PAJA or 
alternatively, for the remedial order to be reviewed in terms of section 1(c) of the Constitution under the principle of 
legality. The Public Protector submitted that the impugned remedial action is not administrative action as it did not 
materially affect the rights of the applicants neither did it have a direct external effect on their rights as it was a mere 
recommendation. However, it was asserted at paragraph 50 of this judgment that it is clear that the decision and 
remedial action set out in the report by the Public Protector is administrative action which falls squarely in the 
definition of administrative action, according to the provisions of PAJA . The court accordingly reviewed and set 
aside the remedial action in terms of section 6(2)(a)(i) of the PAJA which deals with lawfulness and in terms of 
section 6(2)(c) of the PAJA which deals with procedural unfairness.  
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Although overlaps are to be found in judicial review in terms of the PAJA and in terms of the 
principle of legality, as “the grounds of review that apply in respect of both pathways to review 
ultimately derive from the same source – the common law”,379 this study agrees with the 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in this instance. This is so as firstly, review in 
terms of the principle of legality is more lenient than review in terms of the PAJA,380 which 
means it will not be easy to set aside the Public Protector’s decision in terms of the legality 
approach. More importantly, this study agrees with the court’s approach in this instance due to 
its reasoning in paragraph 37 of its judgment (discussed under section 4.2 above). Of particular 
significance is the court’s assertion that: “the office of the Public Protector is a unique institution 
designed to strengthen constitutional democracy”.  
 
The manner in which the Court was at pains to emphasize that the Public Protector stands apart 
from other institutions of public governance has an even more significant implication, that being: 
there could actually be a fourth category of public power – one that is not executive, legislative 
or administrative but one that is sui generis in nature. This additional category of public power 
could (as it is in relation to the exercise of the Public Protector’s power in terms of section 
182(1)(c) of the Constitution), be labelled as “corrective” power since it entails the issuance of 
corrective or remedial steps to be taken in instances where improper or prejudicial governmental 
conduct is found to have occurred.381 The approach by the Court in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Public Protector of South Africa accordingly finds support in this study as it rightfully illustrates 
how the Public Protector: “[i]s a special institution, indigenous to South Africa, whose functions 
and the nature of its powers reflect the unique DNA of South Africa’s nascent democracy”.382  
 
3. Suggestions and Recommendations  
 
                                                          
379
 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA) at paras 27 and 38.  
380 In this regard, Plasket AJA asserted in footnote 25 of the Minister of Home Affairs decision that “At present, in 
respect of the principle of legality, not every ground of review has been defined by the courts with the precision one 
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382 LC Reif The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights System (2004) 238. 
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This study has shown how (in light of high rising levels of corruption in South Africa) it is 
imperative for anti-corruption enforcement agencies such as the Office of the Public Protector to 
be adequately capacitated such that they are able to operate freely and devoid of any inhibitions. 
There is thus a clear need to formulate feasible strategies for the South African Public Protector 
aimed at curbing grand scale corruption in an equitable and apolitical manner that will more 
likely ensure accountability of the highest-ranking members of government and set an example, 
starting from the top – that graft will not be tolerated.383 
 
(a) On enhancing the Office of the Public Protector 
 
Accordingly, in order to safeguard the independence and dignity of the institution as well as to 
ensure its efficiency and effectiveness in the fight against corruption it is suggested firstly that: 
the Office of the Public Protector needs a champion or strong ally in Parliament.384 One of the 
ways it can do so is for Parliament to seriously and very urgently engage in meaningful debate of 
the contents of the 2007 Asmal Report.385 Of particular significance with regard to the Office of 
the Public Protector are the following concerns raised and observations made in the Asmal report 
namely that: Financial independence is an important indicator of true independence.386 However, 
it has emerged that: (i) the Public Protector (and the Commission for Gender Equality) consult 
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the Minister of Finance when appointing staff387 and significantly that, (ii) budget allocations for 
the Public Protector are  found in the budget vote of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development.388 
 
It was conceded in respect of (i) above that such an arrangement could very well be for 
pragmatic reasons, that is, confirmation of financial resources.389 The Asmal investigatory 
committee was however mindful of how crucial it is for this institution to manifestly be seen to 
be outside of government and such arrangements thus impact negatively on the perceived 
independence of the Public Protector and create the false impression that the institution is 
accountable to the respective government department for the use of its finances.390 This 
impression may not only arise in the mind of the public but in that of an incumbent as well, 
which may result in the very real possibility of the Office not pursuing certain grievances 
brought against government or in favourable findings being made out of fear of funds being 
withheld. Consideration therefore ought to be seriously given to the Asmal committee’s 
recommendation for the location of the Public Protector’s budget in the budget vote of 
Parliament (as opposed to direct allocation from a government department) in recognition of the 
fact that this institution is accountable only and directly to the people’s democratically elected 
representatives in the National Assembly.391 This suggestion is actually in line with the original 
concept for the ombudsman’s office, which was for it to be linked to the legislature. The 
Ugandan Inspectorate of Government is a noteworthy example. Its financial independence is 
buttressed by the provisions of Article 229(1) of the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, which declares 
that:  
 
[T]he Inspectorate of Government shall have an independent budget appropriated by Parliament, and 
controlled by the Inspectorate.392  
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This is commendable as independence is an important attribute that most clearly underpins a 
national institution’s legitimacy and credibility and hence its effectiveness.393 In sharp contrast, 
South Africa’s Public Protector, despite constitutional and legislative guarantees of political 
autonomy, is currently almost entirely financially dependent on the executive.394 
 
It is thus suggested that urgent implementation of this recommendation in particular should be 
effected as the office of the Public Protector occupies a very politically sensitive position due to 
its wide ranging powers to investigate the workings of government. This, in turn, necessitates 
more vigorous protection of its independence to ensure the legitimacy of this institution in the 
eyes of the public.395 Parliament’s oversight role thus needs to be fully maximized to lobby the 
formulation of policy that solidifies the Public Protector’s independence.  
 
The 2007 Asmal Report also found that the Office of the Public Protector conducted very few 
proactive investigations with a total of only forty one own-initiative investigations being 
conducted by the office from 2002 to 2007 during Advocate Lawrence Mushwana’s tenure.396 
Things essentially remained the same under the country's third Public Protector. The 2010 
investigation into the improper procurement in the leasing of office accommodation for the 
SAPS was conducted only after complaints were lodged by Paul Hoffman of the Institute for 
Accountability in Southern Africa and Pieter Groenewald of the Freedom Front Plus.397 These 
complaints originated from a newspaper article published by the Sunday Times on 1 August 
2010 alleging improper conduct and maladministration by police National Commissioner Bheki 
Cele and the Department of Public Works.398 
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Further, the 2011 investigation into various corporate governance failures at the SABC was also 
only conducted by the Public Protector following the lodging of a complaint on the 11th of 
November 2011.399 Again, the Public Protector's investigation into the opulent upgrades at the 
President's private Nkandla residence at taxpayer's expense was conducted only after the Public 
Protector received a total of seven complaints between 13 December 2011 and November 
2012.400 Worth noting is how these complaints were lodged after the publication of a series of 
articles by the Mail and Guardian newspaper. The above cases were not only of grave public 
importance, but tellingly, received considerable coverage in the media. It is only fair to deduce 
from the latter that the Public Protector's office was aware of unfolding events yet the office only 
acted after having been approached by concerned individuals, in some instances more than once. 
 
This study accordingly recommends the amendment of enabling legislation to make it mandatory 
for the Public Protector to act, particularly in cases where a matter is of great public importance, 
and immediately or reasonably soon after the facts of such cases are in the public domain. Such 
an approach would enhance respect for the office as an institution seriously committed to curbing 
grand scale corruption. This measure would also ensure the effective discharge of this 
institution's constitutional obligation to be impartial and to exercise its powers and perform its 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice regardless of the office holder at any given time. 
 
It is posited that this approach, or rather its feasibility, is worth looking into considering (the yet 
to be overturned) 2011 Supreme Court of Appeal decision in which the Public Protector's 
mandate under the Constitution was held to be investigatory which means that:  
 
the Public Protector is different from an ordinary Ombudsman as the office’s function goes beyond that of a 
passive adjudicator between citizens and the State but is one requiring proactiveness in appropriate 
                                                          
399 T Madonsela When Governance and Ethics Fail: A Report on an investigation into allegations of 
maladministration, systemic governance deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi 
Moetseneng by the South African Broadcasting Corporation Report No 23 of 2013/2014  Available at: 
http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/201314/WHEN%20GOVERNANCE%20FAILS%20REPORT
%20EXEC%20SUMMARY.pdf (Accessed: 12 August 2016) . 
400 T Madonsela Secure in Comfort: Report on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical 
conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at 
and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal province Report 
No. 25 of 2013/14 at 5 Available at:  




circumstances and significantly that this proactiveness is required whenever the Public Protector becomes 
aware of maladministration, malfeasance and impropriety in public life (emphasis added).401 
 
(b) On the constitutionality of the Public Protector Act  
 
While the thoroughness of the research conducted and the richness of the findings contained in 
the Asmal Report cannot be denied, there is still one crucial aspect that it sidestepped. 
Essentially, the Committee shied away from seriously looking into any possible gaps in the legal 
framework regulating the Office of the Public Protector, despite being mandated (in the terms of 
reference contained in the resolution by the National Assembly which established the multiparty 
ad hoc committee) to assess whether the current (and intended) legal instruments governing the 
respective institutions were suitable in light of the political environment they operated in.402 
Rather, it ultimately recommended that the Office should continue without any substantive 
changes to either its mandate or its powers and functions.403 
 
As events turned out however, particularly those that gave rise to the Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly judgment, the current legal framework under which 
this institution operates is not sufficiently suitable for the political environment in which it exists. 
This serves to underscore the crucial need to tackle an important issue that needs to be put to 
rest: the constitutional status of the Public Protector Act in the wake of the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling on Nkandla. Although the long title of the Act indicates that it was enacted to provide for 
matters incidental to the office of the Public Protector as contemplated in the Constitution 
(emphasis added) one finds that the definition section of the Act is devoid of key phrases found 
in section 182(1) of the Constitution.404 Further, the Public Protector has no power to take any 
binding corrective action against persons or organs of state under the Public Protector Act which 
is completely silent on this issue – indeed, the phrase “appropriate remedial action” is not 
expounded upon anywhere in the Act. The Act has been amended five times; each time without 
any of these issues being addressed. It is averred in this respect that the Act needs to provide 
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clarity in respect of matters that cannot be dealt with comprehensively under section 182(1) of 
the Constitution and essentially, mirror the objective of the Constitution, which is the primary 
source of the Public Protector’s powers. 
 
As subordinate legislation cannot, due to the constitution’s supremacy, have the effect of 
watering down the powers already conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Public 
Protector,405 it is accordingly asserted that the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994, is inconsistent 
with the meaning and purpose of sections 182(1) and (2) of the Constitution, and consequently 
does not pass constitutional muster. It is suggested firstly that the definition section of the Public 
Protector Act should be amended to incorporate important terminology found, or necessarily 
implied, under section 182(1) of the Constitution. To begin with, the phrase “take appropriate 
remedial action” should be reflected in the definition section of the Public Protector Act possibly 
as follows: 
 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates - 
 
appropriate (in respect of remedial action) means nothing less than effective, suitable, proper or fitting to 
redress or undo the prejudice, impropriety, unlawful enrichment or corruption, in a particular case;406 
 
binding means the legal effect of recommendations made, or remedial measures taken, against persons 
and/or organs of state; by the Public Protector in terms of his or her constitutionally allocated remedial 
powers under section 182(1) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; such remedial 
measures having the effect, absent judicial review, of creating a positive legal obligation and/or obligations, 
against those on whom it is taken;407 
 
non-binding means the legal effect of recommendations made, or remedial measures taken, against persons 
and/or organs of state; by the Public Protector pursuant to section 182(1) (c) of the Constitution; which do 
not result in the creation of a positive legal obligation and/or obligations; but in respect of which those 
against whom it is taken are required to properly consider, in order to determine the course to follow.408 
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It is suggested further that the phrase “appropriate remedial action” should be elucidated upon in 
the Act especially as it is a key pointer in relation to the powers of the Public Protector. To 
illustrate, section 6(4) of the Act could proceed as follows: 
 
The Public Protector shall be competent to take appropriate remedial action which shall include the power - 
(a)  to determine and stipulate legally binding recommendations and/or remedial measures:  
(i)  which shall stand and bind until reviewed and set aside in a court of law and must be complied 
with the instant such remedial measures are taken or recommendations given;  
(ii)  only against those that he or she is constitutionally and statutorily empowered to investigate; and 
(iii)  only when  it is appropriate or practicable to effectively remedy or undo the complaint…409 
(e)  For the purposes of this section, what constitutes “appropriate remedial action” 
(i)  is, at all times in the Public Protector’s sole discretion; 
(ii)  who shall have the power to determine and stipulate the remedy as well as direct and/or prescribe 
its implementation.410 
(f)  Whether a particular action or measure employed by the Public Protector is binding or non-
binding: 
(i)  is a matter of interpretation; 
(ii)  aided by context, nature and language; and 
(iii)  which shall at all times be informed by the nature of the issues under investigation; the 
appropriateness of the remedial measure to deal properly with the subject matter of the 
investigation, and in line with the findings made.411 
 
Finally, the study posits further that there is a need to militate against current and future office 
holders from misinterpreting the scope or reach of their powers, as appears to have been the case 
with Advocate Mkhwebane’s report into the Absa Bank apartheid-era loan from the Reserve 
Bank in which she sought to change the Constitution to remove the Reserve Bank’s central 
mandate of keeping inflation under control. This study accordingly recommends that section 6(6) 
of the Public Protector Act should also be amended to expand the list of matters that would fall 
outside the purview of the Public Protector's powers. The legislature could, for instance, 
expressly indicate that nothing in the Act shall be construed as empowering the Public Protector 
to make economic policy or amend the Constitution, that is, in addition to not being able to 
investigate the performance of judicial functions by any court of law. 
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4. Concluding remarks  
 
In closing, it can be asserted that the facts that collectively make up the Nkandla matter, have 
been, without doubt, the most telling in terms of revealing the sharp decline in ethical 
governance and the subsequent corrosive effect on key constitutional principles particularly 
accountability, transparency and the rule of law. The Public Protector’s “Secure in Comfort” 
report as well as the Constitutional Court’s subsequent ruling on the matter have been very 
significant in the corruption discourse in South Africa since the facts of the case became public 
knowledge412 and are regarded as a litmus test of the effectiveness of efforts to ensure public 
accountability and curb public corruption in South Africa.413  
 
It is in this light that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Public Protector gains more meaning. As mentioned above, a significant implication of this 
judgment is that there could, in fact, be a fourth category of public power. A case could thus be 
made for the consideration of the Public Protector (and possibly other Chapter Nine institutions) 
as a fourth, but separate, arm of government that exercises corrective power. This is even more 
so as in the wake of the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 
judgment, the Public Protector’s office has emerged as a formidable and tenacious force in terms 
of getting public functionaries to account for decisions made and as an important addition to the 
armoury of mechanisms that are employed to create the substance of accountable constitutional 
governance.414  
 
However, the institution’s woes are far from over. It has been shown how there are certain 
shortcomings in the legislature’s regulation of the Public Protector’s powers which, if left as is, 
will most likely contribute to the hindrances that prevent the office from functioning to its full 
potential in curbing corruption within government and enforcing the rule of law; further, how its 
optimal functioning continues to be hampered by lack of cooperation and support from state 
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organs, and from senior government officials and how, in reality, the efficacy of this vital 
institution remains heavily reliant on the character or moral convictions of the individual at the 
head of this institution.  
 
Suggestions can be given as to how, for instance, the requirements for appointment should not 
turn so heavily on legal qualifications and experience in the administration of justice but more on 
a proven track record or demonstrable passion, commitment and enthusiastic engagement in 
matters relating to, among other things: the promotion of accountability, transparency and 
openness in public administration; the advancement of human rights;  in fostering respect for and 
adherence to the rule of law and in combatting corruption and who would thus be more likely to 
execute their duties with courage and conviction of purpose; or as to how enabling legislation 
should be amended to clearly reflect the Public Protector’s competence to take binding remedial 
action. However, these suggestions, even if taken seriously, will remain ineffectual in the face of 
a deep-rooted lack of political will to address corruption at the highest levels of government. 
 
It is in this vein that Stanley F. Anderson has warned that not too much must be expected from 
ombudsmen; they are not Don Quixotes who will solve problems of poverty, prejudice and 
corruption in public administration. Neither can they change the very climate of society.415 The 
preservation of democracy in South Africa consequently requires the active participation of all 
the various stakeholders: the media, the judiciary, Parliament, civil society groups as well as that 
of ordinary South African citizens. Ultimately, it rests on the genuine desire, on the part of 
government, to curb (rather than instigate and exacerbate) corruption as well as to protect and 
ensure the dignity and independence of established anti-corruption institutions so as to guarantee 
their effectiveness. 
 
The Constitution has already laid the foundation through its intricate system of checks and 
balances aimed at constraining the exercise of public power for the purposes of consolidating and 
sustaining democracy within the Republic and also through being a progressive blueprint for 
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addressing the legacies of apartheid.416 The Public Protector, as an independent state institution 
meant to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic, will, in the process of doing so, 
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